The law should make explicitly clear use of a privacy sleeve to protect the secrecy of the ballot for voters with disabilities meets the requirement that the "entire process, including vote verification and vote casting, is equipped for individuals with disabilities." The provision that accessible voting systems can be supplemented by Braille or tactile ballots does not serve this purpose.
7. Error Rates, Benchmarks
7a. Error Rates
System error rates for vote counting shall not exceed standards in the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), but errors attributable to acts of voters need not be taken into account.[25]
Wrong!
The EAC and VVSG have kept voting systems error rates low by attributing errors to "poorly trained voters and poll workers" and failing to keep records of the incidents. See the testimony of John Washburn, http://www.wheresthepaper.org/JohnWashburnTestimony20070507.pdf especially beginning on page 5, as well as other testimony presented at the May 7, 2007, Field Hearing of the Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census, and National Archives of the Committee on House Administration, U. S. House of Representatives, www.wheresthepaper.org/news.html#May7_07FieldHearing
Due to the absence of any forensic or investigatory process for determining the cause of a given error, or whether it occurred during, or was caused by, system recording, casting, storage, handling or counting of votes, any errors can be attributed to any cause. Thus the EAC has been able to disregard common-sense evidence of fraud and system malfunctions by attributing errors to acts of voters.
Meanwhile, persons who have wished to investigate errors have been prevented from doing so by vendors and state and local election administrators, citing trade secret provisions of their contracts for purchase of electronic voting systems. No freely-conducted forensic examination or study of system-related irregularities has ever been allowed.
Lastly, it is unclear how the act of a voter can cause a machine to count erroneously.
Solution
All errors should be recorded and studied. The law should designate a technical entity to be responsible for monitoring the error rates of voting systems, identifying the cause of errors, and maintaining a database of errors so that error patterns can be identified over time.
7b. Residual Ballot Performance Benchmark
The EAC shall issue a "residual ballot performance benchmark" that includes overvotes, spoiled or uncountable votes, and undervotes, but excludes intentional undervotes. The EAC shall base the benchmark "on evidence of best practices in representative jurisdictions."[26] States may not exceed this benchmark.
The EAC can set different rates for "distinct communities", because "Congress finds that there are certain distinct communities in certain geographic areas that have historically high rates of intentional undervoting in elections for Federal office, relative to the rest of the Nation."[27]
The EAC shall identify distinct communities with "significantly higher than average rates of historical intentional undervoting" and set a separate benchmark for local jurisdictions "in which that distinct community has a substantial presence" or exclude such jurisdictions from the national benchmark, as appropriate.[28]
Wrong!
7. Error Rates, Benchmarks
7a. Error Rates
System error rates for vote counting shall not exceed standards in the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), but errors attributable to acts of voters need not be taken into account.[25]
The EAC and VVSG have kept voting systems error rates low by attributing errors to "poorly trained voters and poll workers" and failing to keep records of the incidents. See the testimony of John Washburn, http://www.wheresthepaper.org/JohnWashburnTestimony20070507.pdf especially beginning on page 5, as well as other testimony presented at the May 7, 2007, Field Hearing of the Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census, and National Archives of the Committee on House Administration, U. S. House of Representatives, www.wheresthepaper.org/news.html#May7_07FieldHearing
Due to the absence of any forensic or investigatory process for determining the cause of a given error, or whether it occurred during, or was caused by, system recording, casting, storage, handling or counting of votes, any errors can be attributed to any cause. Thus the EAC has been able to disregard common-sense evidence of fraud and system malfunctions by attributing errors to acts of voters.
Meanwhile, persons who have wished to investigate errors have been prevented from doing so by vendors and state and local election administrators, citing trade secret provisions of their contracts for purchase of electronic voting systems. No freely-conducted forensic examination or study of system-related irregularities has ever been allowed.
Lastly, it is unclear how the act of a voter can cause a machine to count erroneously.
Solution
All errors should be recorded and studied. The law should designate a technical entity to be responsible for monitoring the error rates of voting systems, identifying the cause of errors, and maintaining a database of errors so that error patterns can be identified over time.
7b. Residual Ballot Performance Benchmark
The EAC shall issue a "residual ballot performance benchmark" that includes overvotes, spoiled or uncountable votes, and undervotes, but excludes intentional undervotes. The EAC shall base the benchmark "on evidence of best practices in representative jurisdictions."[26] States may not exceed this benchmark.
The EAC can set different rates for "distinct communities", because "Congress finds that there are certain distinct communities in certain geographic areas that have historically high rates of intentional undervoting in elections for Federal office, relative to the rest of the Nation."[27]
The EAC shall identify distinct communities with "significantly higher than average rates of historical intentional undervoting" and set a separate benchmark for local jurisdictions "in which that distinct community has a substantial presence" or exclude such jurisdictions from the national benchmark, as appropriate.[28]
Wrong!
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