The law should support prohibition of communications capability by requiring inspection and enforcement. If a jurisdiction is incapable of inspection (for example, due to trade secret provisions in its purchase contract), the jurisdiction should be prohibited from using the equipment.
12. Security Standards
Security consists of:[42]
--States must set standards for chain of custody documentation, state election officials must comply, and the documentation must be made available to the EAC upon request.
--Software must be disclosed as specified earlier.
--After a system is certified, the manufacturer may not alter the software, or insert or use any uncertified software (but, the EAC can provide emergency certification[29]) .
--Upon request, states must submit information about the state's compliance to the EAC.
Chain of custody documentation is easily fabricated. This section establishes a relationship between manufacturers, states, and the EAC, but does not provide for citizen scrutiny and oversight which might be more likely to detect inconsistencies that indicate falsification or fabrication of the documentation.
The prohibition against changes to certified software should not be limited to the manufacturer.
Emergency certification is a loophole that nullifies the certification testing concept.
Solution
It is easier for a group of citizens to watch some ballot boxes for a few weeks than to examine chain of custody documentation, read disclosed software to determine whether it was corrupted by illegal alteration, and try to determine whether an untested software patch that received emergency certification caused a voting system to fail. This is another reason why the law should ban electronic voting systems and require all aspects of election administration to be open to meaningful public observation, and that the handling of votes and ballots be software independent.
If any electronic system is used, after it is certified, all persons should be prohibited from altering the software or inserting or using any uncertified software.
Chain of custody documentation should be publicly available for citizen scrutiny.
13. Emergency paper ballots in case of system or equipment failure
If circumstances at a polling place, including voting system failure, cause significant disruption of the voting process for voters, individuals waiting to cast a ballot shall be informed of their right to an emergency paper ballot, and upon request provided with one, which shall be counted as a regular ballot.[43,44]
Wrong!
"Failure of voting equipment" and "significant disruption" need to be defined. Otherwise voters can be blamed for vote-switching on the touchscreen, errors in the final review screen or VVPAT, and other common DRE failures, and voters can be forced to use malfunctioning equipment.
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