Now we will show that the appellate panel got it wrong on the fundamental tenets of bribery law.
I don't think I've ever read of any portion of the Siegelman case described as comical. But it's almost funny to read the 11th Circuit's pathetic attempt to split hairs on the Siegelman appeal.
But when you look at the full picture, as we have endeavored to do, you realize the three judges are full of that stuff you try not to step in when walking in a barnyard.
The critical case law in the Siegelman appeal is McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). A discussion of that case is what leads the 11th Circuit into its "explicit vs. express" soliloquy. It's also where the 11th Circuit goes badly off track.
The court acknowledges that this is the quid pro quo ("something for something") required by law. So far, so good.
But then comes this:
Defendants, however, assert that the instruction was inadequate under McCormick. Defendants assert that the instruction failed to tell the jury that not only must they find that Siegelman and Scrushy agreed to a quid pro quo, the CON Board seat for the donation, but that this agreement had to be express. We disagree that McCormick requires such an instruction.
There's only one problem with the court's assertion that the Siegelman team argued that the agreement must be "express." It isn't true.
By my unofficial count, the Siegelman appellate brief argues at least a dozen times that the agreement must be "explicit." Here is just one example:
To recognize the correctness of our argument on this point, it is useful to begin with McCormick v. U.S., 500 U.S. 257, 111 S.Ct. 1807 (1991). There, the Supreme Court read the extortion statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, in precisely the way that we are suggesting that the present statutes ought to be read as well. Recognizing that campaign contributions are a constant in the real life of politicians, the Court held that a link between such a contribution and an official act would constitute the crime of extortion only if there was an “explicit quid pro quo.” Id., 500 U.S. at 271 & n.9, 111 S.Ct. at 1815 & n.9 (formulating the question in that way); 500 U.S. at 273, 111 S.Ct. at 1816 (“only if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.”). The Court held that if the Congress wanted to criminalize conduct short of that, conduct that “in a very real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by private contributions or expenditures,” Congress would have to be explicit about it. 500 U.S. at 272-73, 111 S.Ct. at 1816.
Over and over, the Siegelman team makes the same argument, quoting directly from McCormick: The agreement must be "explicit."
By my count, the core portion of the Siegelman brief uses the word "express" twice. Once, it's a parenthetical, almost throwaway, use. Here it is:
The Court was thus speaking overtly in terms of explicit, express, promises and agreements.
On another occasion, the brief states that a prominent law dictionary says the two words are interchangeable. But never does the Siegelman brief argue that the agreement must be "express" instead of "explicit"--or even "express" in addition to "explicit."
The Siegelman brief mentions the word "express" only in terms of paraphrasing. Contrary to what the 11th Circuit claims, that is not its core argument. Its core argument is based on a word-for-word recitation of McCormick, which the 11th Circuit admits is the controlling law. In fact, after its one primary use of the word "express," the Siegelman team comes right back with this: