Friedman: The major disadvantage of the proposed negative income tax is its political implications. It establishes a system under which taxes are imposed on some to pay subsidies to others. And presumably, these others have a vote. There is always the danger that instead of being an arrangement under which the great majority tax themselves willingly to help an unfortunate minority, it will be converted into one under which a majority imposes taxes for its own benefit on an unwilling minority. Because this proposal makes the process so explicit, the danger is perhaps greater than with other measures. I see no solution to this problem except to rely on the self-restraint and good will of the electorate. P. 194
Note: So Friedman is scared to death that the poor will take over the country and impose terrible conditions on the rich. Perhaps if this tax were presented directly to the voters in a national referendum, this would be a remote possibility. Otherwise, Congress would have to be packed with poor people. I don't see that happening.
Friedman: Writing about a corresponding problem - British old-age pensions - in 1914 Dicey said, "Surely a sensible and benevolent man may well ask himself whether England as a whole will gain by enacting that the receipt of poor relief, in the shape of a pension, shall be consistent with the pensioner's retaining the right to join in the election of a Member of Parliament." P. 194
Note: So, anyone who receives government assistance should be disenfranchised? This is the conclusion of "a sensible and benevolent man?" Why don't we coin a phrase like "compassionate conservative" and be done with it. This is the true face of conservatives - give 'em $300 per year and don't let them vote!
Over and over again Dr. Friedman makes comments that invoke an assumption that of course the free market is more efficient, more desirable, and more flexible than government programs can ever be. Particularly when no evidence is presented to show that the specific programs at issue have been operated in a superior way by private enterprises, I assigned them to this category.
Friedman: The characteristic feature of action through political channels is that it tends to require or enforce substantial conformity. The great advantage of the market, on the other hand, is that it permits wide diversity. P. 15
Note: There are so many major exceptions to both of these assertions that we must conclude they are wrong. Our laws provide a virtually endless number of programs for persons in specific situations. In the market both monopoly and the race to the lowest common denominator of costs are strong forces that reduce diversity.
Friedman: [a more lengthy argument that government has to be inflexible] P. 23
Note: Again, government has the potential to be extremely flexible and specific. For example, consider the tax code.
Friedman: If railroads had never been subjected to regulation in the United States, it is nearly certain that by now transportation, including railroads, would be a highly competitive industry with little or no remaining monopoly elements. P. 29
Note: Wow! Totally unsubstantiated pronouncement of an ideological bias. Early railroad barons were skilful at manipulating markets and customers to their advantage. There is no basis in reality for this "certainty."
Friedman: Here, as in other fields, competitive enterprise is likely to be far more efficient in meeting consumer demand than either nationalized enterprises or enterprises run to serve other purposes. P. 91
Note: This is pure ideological prejudice unsupported by any evidence. Enterprises can be well or poorly designed and thus be either efficient or inefficient whether private or public. A recent example is the Bush push to "privatize" social security. Bush's own financial advisors noted that government-run social security has administrative overhead of 0.9 percent. Their model of privatized social security predicted an overhead of 5 percent.
Friedman: " additional problems raised by the administration of schools as a governmental function. P. 98
Note: What "additional problems"? None are cited here. This is more ideological prejudice, pure and simple.
Friedman: And it would do so not by impeding competition, destroying incentive, and dealing with symptoms, as would result from the outright redistribution of income, but by strengthening competition, making incentives effective, and eliminating the causes of inequality. P. 107
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