Friedman: " perhaps the most difficult problems arise from monopoly " and from "neighborhood effects" " P. 14
Note: Monopoly is one example of differences in power between parties to a potential transaction. Our complex society contains myriad situations containing this differential - enough to create great economic disparity and hardship.
Friedman: " there are only three alternatives that seem available: private monopoly, public monopoly, or public regulation. P. 28
Note: Seems very arbitrary and unimaginative. How about new products or business models that alter the tendency toward monopoly, for example?
Friedman: The use of government to establish, support and enforce cartel and monopoly arrangements among private producers has grown much more rapidly than direct government monopoly and is currently far more important. P. 125
Note: I doubt that the charters, mission statements, and enabling legislation to create various boards and commissions would acknowledge this role. Here the devil is in the details. If friends of industry are appointed to these agencies, and they align themselves with these industry goals rather than with fair and impartial regulation, the results described by Friedman are highly likely.
Friedman: " the regulatory agencies often tend themselves to fall under the control of the producers and so prices may not be any lower with regulation than without regulation. P. 128
Note: When strongly pro-business, anti-regulation politicians have the opportunity make the appointments, this sort of corruption is especially likely to occur.
Friedman: Another striking fact, contrary to popular conception, is that capitalism leads to less inequality than alternative systems of organization and that the development of capitalism has greatly lessened the extent of inequality. P. 169
Note: Perhaps we need to distinguish between capitalism guided by thoughtful government regulation and balanced by labor organizations strong enough to bargain effectively with corporations, versus the deregulated free market advocated by Friedman. In the former case (with regulation and labor power) we have seen a reduction in inequality. In the latter free market situation, however, this statement is demonstrably false. In her great book "The Shock Doctrine," Naomi Klein has documented the destruction of the middle class, the promotion to the rich to become super rich, and the economic serfdom of the less fortunate citizens in country after country when these countries moved from regulated free enterprise with economic "safety nets" to naked free enterprise, "Chicago School" style. More recently, following Wall Street deregulation in the U.S., we have documented evidence that the gap between the most wealthy and the least wealthy Americans has grown rapidly.
Friedman: The methods that governments have used most widely to alter the distribution of income have been graduated income and inheritance taxation. " have they succeeded " No conclusive answer can be given " P. 172
Note: Absence of data does not stop Friedman from speculating, and guess what? He doesn't like taxes!
Friedman: Surely the families being helped would rather have a given sum in cash than in the form of housing. P. 178
Note: Here is another overly broad generalization. Again many complexities enter in, in real life. How much subsidy will be appropriate? How much (or little) power will subsidized families have in the open real estate market? If a family chooses to use the cash in other ways and consequently remains homeless, what are the neighborhood effects?
Friedman: Far from improving the housing of the poor, as its proponents expected, public housing has done just the reverse " The general interest that motivated many to favor instituting the program is diffuse and transitory. Once the program was adopted, it was bound to be dominated by the special interests that it could serve. P. 179
Note: The devil is, as always, in the details. The observation of the distinction between diffuse "general interest" and intense "special interest" is, I believe, a great point for all social scientists to learn and consider. However, Friedman, in my opinion, misapplies it. He seems to take it as an inevitable bar to effective government intervention. Knowledge of this tendency could, on the other hand, spur politicians to demand, and program administrators to implement, safeguards to avoid this situation. Programs can be well or poorly designed, and this is equally true for government programs and private programs.
Next Page 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13
(Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher).
