In testimony49 about high-containment biosafety laboratories presented to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations in October 2007, Keith Rhodes, chief technologist at the Center for Technology and Engineering, points out that BSL4 labs in the U.S. increased from five to 15 between 2001 and 2007 alone, and that no one is actually responsible for tracking the proliferation of BSL 3 and 4 labs in the U.S. or determining the risks associated with them.
On top of that there are dozens more BSL 3 laboratories. The map below was published in the journal Science50 in 2007 and reprinted in Asia Times51 April 6, 2020, showing the proliferation of high-containment labs in the U.S. A USA Today investigation published in 2015 put the number of BSL 3 and 4 labs in the U.S. around 200,52 and Boyle estimates there are about 400 worldwide.53
The Danger Outweighs Any Potential Benefit
As long as we are creating the risk, the benefit will always be secondary. By taking dangerous pathogens and making them even more lethal through gain-of-function research, scientists and those who fund them are playing a high-risk game of Russian Roulette.54 Any scientific or medical gains made from such research pales in comparison to the incredible risks involved. This sentiment has been echoed by others in a variety of scientific publications.55,56,57,58
Considering the potential for a massively lethal pandemic, I believe it's safe to say that BSL 3 and 4 laboratories pose a very real and serious existential threat to humanity. U.S. biowarfare programs employ some 13,000 scientists,59 all of whom are hard at work creating ever-deadlier pathogens, while the public is simply told to trust that these pathogens will never be released, either involuntarily or voluntarily.
Historical facts tell us accidental exposures and releases have already happened, and we only have our lucky stars to thank that none have turned into pandemics taking the lives of millions. Considering safety breaches at these labs number in the hundreds, it's only a matter of time before something really nasty gets out. Consider the ramifications if a souped-up Ebola or Spanish flu were to get out, for example.
Regardless of the exact method behind its creation, it seems clear to me that SARS-CoV-2 has been modified and that its origin is being covered up by responsible parties. Why the cover-up? In short, to avoid life behind bars. The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 states:60
"Whoever knowingly develops, produces, stockpiles, transfers, acquires, retains, or possesses any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon, or knowingly assists a foreign state or any organization to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both. There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section committed by or against a national of the United States."
With sufficient evidence, many researchers and public health authorities stand to spend the rest of their lives behind bars, which is the penalty that the Anti-Terrorism Act calls for. This is why it is vital that we initiate immediate actions to start closing BSL 3 and 4 laboratories that are working with the most lethal pathogens known to man and prosecuting those involved in biowarfare-related research.
If we fail to start this process soon, and simply wait until something worse escapes, the COVID-19 pandemic will seem like a walk in the park and we could approach death rates more similar to the Spanish flu of 1918 or even the bubonic plague that wiped out 60% of Europe.
Sources and References
- 1,2New York Times May 3, 2020
- 3Bookshop.org, Biowarfare and Terrorism by Francis Boyle
- 4Institute of Medicine. Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories 2011
- 5The Guardian December 4, 2014
- 6CIDRAP July 1, 2016
- 7Reuters February 15, 2012
- 8CIDRAP June 20, 2014
- 9,16,51Asia Times April 6, 2020
- 10Science September 28, 2007; 317(5846): 1852-1854
- 11New York Times, July 9, 2014
- 12New York Times, June 20, 2014
- 13Popular Mechanics July 31, 2014
- 14Reuters June 21, 2014
- 15GAO.gov August 2016, High-Containment Laboratories Improved Oversight of Dangerous Pathogens Needed to Mitigate Risk (PDF)
- 17,52USA Today May 28, 2015
- 18,54Slate April 11, 2014
- 19Consortium News August 30, 2017
- 20WJLA January 22, 2020
- 21NPR November 7, 2014
- 22New York Times December 19, 2017 (Archived)
- 23,24The Scientist November 16, 2015
- 25Nature February 22, 2017
- 26Washington Post April 14, 2020 (Archived)
- 27Business Insider April 14, 2020
- 28,29,33,34Newsweek April 28, 2020
- 30NIH Project Information, Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence
- 31Nature Medicine 2015; 21: 1508-1513
- 32,35,36,38Salon April 24, 2020
- 37,39Nature Medicine March 17, 2020; 26: 450-452
- 40The Lancet March 7, 2020; 395(10226): E42-E43
- 41Scripps Research March 17, 2020
- 42,43Great Game India Journal of Geopolitics & International Relations March 30, 2020
- 44Great Game India COVID-19 Files
- 45Anthrax Epizootic in Zimbabwe, 1978-1980: Due to Deliberate Spread? Meryl Nass, MD (PDF)
- 46Anthraxvaccine.blogspot.com April 2, 2020
- 47,48National Review April 16, 2020
- 49GAO.gov Keith Rhodes Testimony October 4, 2007 (PDF)
- 50Science September 28, 2007; 317(5846): 1852-1854, Figures & Data
- 53,59Scoop February 26, 2020
- 55mBio 2012 Sep-Oct; 3(5): e00360-12
- 56The Human Fatality Burden of Gain of Function Flu Research: A Risk Assessment by Lynn Klotz (PDF)
- 57BMC Medicine 2013; 11, Article number 252
- 58Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists February 25, 2019
- 60S.993 Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989
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