'...the NED has been at the center of all major US State Department-financed "color revolutions" in the world since 2000 when used to topple Milosevic in Serbia.'
-- A Matter of Contention No More --
In order to view the U.S.-Australia relationship in a more contemporary context, it is important to consider the opinions of some prominent Australian public figures about the ever-evolving geopolitical landscape, and from there showcase a more detached, less insular appraisal of U.S. economic, foreign, and national security policy as it has been unfolding in recent years. The aim here is to portray how the continued maintenance of this relationship -- a strategically lopsided affiliation which remains all but a bedrock principle of our own foreign policy, one embraced with equal, unerring enthusiasm by both our major political parties. It is also one likely to assume even greater importance to the U.S. over the coming years and decades -- potentially places our political economy, our national security, our self-determination and sovereignty, and that of our future place in the increasingly Asian-centric geopolitical and geo-economic order, at even greater risk.
In an article earlier this year distinguished Australian public figure John Menadue posted an article on his blog Pearls & Irritations, which suggested that the 'increasing influence of the military and defence establishment in shaping Australia's foreign policy is such that it has effectively undermined the authority of our Foreign Affairs Minister Julie Bishop and that of her Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade (DFAT).' In what should amount to a familiar refrain for many in Washington, Menadue noted the following:
'...Our 'foreign policy' (sic) has been taken over by the defence, security and military clique led by the Department of Defence, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute which is financed by DoD and defence contractors, ASIO, Border Protection and the Office of National Assessments...'
Although active players in contemporary political, diplomatic, and mainstream media circles might refute the tenets of his article, the most telling of Menadue's observation was the following: For him it is patently obvious that our military and defence clique in Australia is in turn 'heavily dependent on the US Departments of Defense, State, [the] CIA and FBI for advice.' [Emphasis Added]
To underscore the legitimacy and portent of Menadue's views, some understanding of his place in the political firmament and his background in both the public and private sectors is useful. From 1960 to 1967 he was private secretary to then deputy opposition leader Gough Whitlam. Menadue then moved into the private sector for seven years as General Manager of Rupert Murdoch's News Limited, and from 1974-76 was head of the Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet. He was closely involved in the events of 1975 that led to Whitlam's dismissal, and then served in the same position under Malcolm Fraser (of whom, more soon), the man who controversially succeeded Whitlam as PM.
After a stretch as Japanese Ambassador from 1976 to 1980, Menadue returned to head the Department of Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, and later in 1983, the Department of Trade. From there he was appointed CEO of Qantas (1986-89), became a Director of Telstra (our biggest telco; 1994-96), and was also Chairman of the Australia Japan Foundation (1991-98). So all up, Menadue was not a man whose opinions might be dismissed easily. At 82, he's still 'Johnnie Walker' and as his blog attests, remains a respected, robust voice in national and business affairs, and in public policy.
Whether academic, politician or public servant, as a prominent public figure Menadue of course, is not on his Pat Malone in highlighting issues vis a vis maintaining our relationship with the U.S. in its current form. The failure or unwillingness of successive governments' to grasp and respond to the new realities that are almost daily presenting themselves as the balance of the geopolitical and geo-economic order tips irrevocably eastward are of particular concern. Of equal concern is that of our reigning political and policy elites -- and again our mainstream media 'opinionocracy' as well -- continued insistence that the bedrock precepts of our foreign, national security, and even our trade policies -- should remain aligned with, even in service thereof, the interests of Washington and Wall Street.
As he noted in an article last year, long time defence and intelligence analyst, Professor Hugh White of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University (ANU), criticised the most recent Aussie Defence White Paper(DWP) in its presumption of America's enduring global primacy. In White's view, whether in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, or especially in Asia, said "primacy" is no longer a given, even if Washington is struggling to come to terms with such verities. As he observes, the DWP promotes a vision of,
'...the rules-based global order' as a 'seamless and indivisible whole that must be either preserved unaltered or surrendered in its entirety'. It sends he says, 'a clear message Australia should be willing to join a war against China to preserve [the rules-based global order] unaltered.' White doesn't mince words here, 'This is plainly wrong'. [Emphasis added.]
The implications for this should not be lost on Australians, and are increasingly seen that way, especially by younger folks. As to whether we might say the same for Americans is an entirely different matter. It most certainly will not be lost on the Chinese themselves -- or for that matter other rising Asian powers such as South Korea, or indeed, even an economically resurgent Japan. All this, to say little of other potentially quiet achievers like Indonesia and to a lesser extent, Vietnam.
To add to all of this -- and to underscore the reality that it isn't just always about geopolitical considerations -- for the first time in Australia's history, we are facing a geopolitical and national security dilemma of considerable magnitude: Our long-time major business and trading partner China -- an alliance kick-started by Whitlam, one that's contributed hugely to our country's stellar economic performance over the past two decades or more and which played no small part in enabling us in ways the U.S. itself wasn't able to, weather the fallout from the Global Financial Crisis (itself largely the consequence of the monumental recklessness of America's multi-national corporate and financial behemoths, enabled by the enduring corruption of its political elites -- is now being challenged directly and no less recklessly and provocatively by our long-time military and security (or strategic) partner the United States.
Here again, the implications are stark indeed. It would not be unreasonable to suggest this "dilemma", this challenge and the existential risk that attends it, surpasses anything we were presented in the First World War, and arguably even that presented to us in the Second World War, when Japanese planes were bombing Darwin and their Navy's submarines were mischief-making in Sydney Harbour. In an assessment in last year prior to our Federal election, renowned former diplomat and senior public servant Richard Woolcott also shared views not dissimilar to both O'Neill and Menadue. As a highly regarded commentator on international affairs with a special expertise on the Asian region (he was at varying points Aussie Ambassador to Indonesia, the Philippines, and the United Nations, along with at one point, president of the UN Security Council), his views cannot, indeed should not, be lightly dismissed.
For the now 90-year-old Woolcott -- whose diplomatic pedigree, as impressive as that of Menadue's in the nation's public service, saw him in Australia's embassy in Moscow at the time of Stalin's death in 1953, and much later as the most senior diplomat at the DFAT -- it is imperative for any future Australian government to be ever mindful of geo-economic factors as much the mutable geopolitical ones. Woolcott seems to appreciate in ways other commentators and analysts possibly don't -- including those on both sides of the Pacific Pond and on both sides of the political divide Down Under -- the indisputable historical reality that it's (geo)economic factors that drive geopolitical developments (from relatively minor border skirmishes to world wars) and not so much the other way around. As he observes,
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