Are the "super-powers" just paper tigers then? Are they unable to project the force that, on paper and in computers, seems so overwhelmingly advantageous?
No.
If the situation were reversed and any of the countries just listed: Afghanistan, Vietnam, even nuclear-powered North Korea, were to attack America, the war would be over quickly, in the case of the first two countries, probably even before any damage was done to our homeland. The fact that it would never occur to any of these countries, yes, even North Korea, to preemptively attack America, should not blind us to the fact of the home front advantage. And it's not just the over-whelming military superiority of American forces that makes such a lop-sided advantage to the "home team" obvious. Afghanistan invading Pakistan would lose. North Korea invading South Korea would be more damaging, but with American allies, it too would lose, eventually. The reverse is almost certainly true as well, South Korea invading North Korea, unsupported by America, or even with American support (again), would also turn out badly for the single or combined forces.
The same situation applies to Russia. Invaded by Germany in WWII, they practiced much the same tactics they are practicing today in Ukraine, but combined with natural advantages of winter (also useful against Napoleon) but mostly the home front advantage, victory was decisive and complete. There's an argument to be made that it was Russia, not America, that mostly defeated Hitler's forces by so weakening them that America could finish them off later in Europe. 20 million Russians were willing to die - albeit with Stalin's fight-or-die prodding in some cases - to defend Russia. Today, 700,000 Russian men, and counting, have fled Russia rather than fight what many consider their closely related former neighbors.
What about Russian support outside its own borders but in support of allies? When Russia went to support President Assad in Syria, they acted competently and forcefully, and together with Syrian forces, effectively routing American forces supporting the rebellion. America still has a rump presence in Syria, but absent the complete fall of Assad, it's very unlikely they will ever extend their presence beyond that.
Similarly, but on a larger scale and more pertinent for today's Russia-Ukraine war (I place Russia first in this paring because they were the military instigator), NATO, supported by 30 European countries as of this writing, but soon to expand by at least two more countries, has clearly been the clear winner in today's conflict, as well as in the post-WWII era. It has taken the home front advantage and extended it to all home fronts. This may yet turn out to be a brilliant strategy, though not for the reasons that NATO is often imagined to be based upon: to oppose Russia collectively. This is what founding article 5 says:
Article 5 of the treaty states that if an armed attack occurs against one of the member states, it shall be considered an attack against all members, and other members shall assist the attacked member, with armed forces if necessary.[1]
It's easy to see that opposing Russia was, and is, part of NATO's unwritten mission, since the United States and Canada are included in the 30 nations each is sworn to defend, and it's hard to make a credible case that it would be the European members of NATO that would so attack these two Western Hemisphere global powers. Russia was, and is still, the main country that NATO was arming against, and the reason why creeping weaponry, right up to the Ukraine-Russia border, was the Red Line that Putin could not allow.
Many were either neutral, or, including this writer, supportive of Russia securing its largest warm water military port in Sevastopol, Crimea, against the disorganized rebellious forces that were dangerously close to destabilizing Russia's great and enormous naval base. Had they done so, it would have been a danger to the world. Had those forces simply cut off Russian access to its own naval port, it would have been a stalemate almost as dangerous, possibly leading to the kind of conflict present today, in 2014. Those forces did throw out pro-Russian former Ukraine president Yanukovych, replacing him with a series of Ukraine presidents, leading up to the most strongly pro-Western president Zelensky (I've been watching his old biting sitcom Servant of the People on Netflix; it's easy to see why this all-bases-covered series persuaded Ukrainians that Zelensky the actor playing the part of president, could be Zelensky the actual president). The mild rebuke of Russia over Crimea, a somewhat detached peninsula mostly occupied by either pro-Russian residents or actual Russian forces, made Putin over-confident that taking over the four eastern and southeastern regions of Ukraine would be similarly simple. This will go down as one of the Greatest Strategic Mistakes in history. Putin under-estimated the Ukraine home front advantage that didn't quite apply to the same degree in Crimea; it remains to be seen how the original motivation for Putin to secure Crimea is answered by Zelensky, who currently wants Crimea back as well. Regaining Crimea will be a major test of who really has the home front advantage, especially after eight, or more, long years under Russian control.
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