What's ultimately at stake in this competition between wobbly Western (neo)liberal democracies and "socialism with Chinese characteristics" (copyright Deng Xiaoping) is the capacity to manage and improve people's lives. Chinese scholars are very proud of their national development plan ethos, defined as SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound).
A very good example is how China, in less than two decades, managed to extricate 800 million people out of poverty: an absolute first in History.
All of the above is rarely evoked as Atlanticist circles drown in virtually 24/7 China demonization hysteria. Wang Huiyao, the director of the Beijing-based Center for China and Globalization, at least had the merit to bring into the discussion Sinologist Kerry Brown of King's College, London.
Drawing from comparisons between Leibniz -- close to Jesuit scholars, interested in Confucianism -- and Montesquieu -- who only saw a despotic, autocratic, imperial system -- Brown re-examines 250 years of entrenched Western positions on China and remarks how is "more difficult than ever" to engage in a reasonable debate.
He identifies three major problems.
1. Throughout modern history, there's no Western appreciation of China as a strong and powerful nation, and its restored historical importance. Western mindsets are not ready to deal with it.
2. The modern West never really thought of China as a global power; at best as a land power. China was never seen as a naval power, or capable of exercising power way beyond its borders.
3. Propelled by the iron certainty over its values -- enter the very much debased concept of "true democracy" -- the Atlanticist West has no idea what to make of Chinese values. Ultimately the West is not interested in understanding China. Confirmation bias reigns; the result is China as a "threat to the West."
Brown points to the key predicament afflicting any scholar or analyst trying to explain China: how to convey China's extremely complex worldview, how to capture the China story in a few words. Soundbites do not apply.
Examples: explaining how a whopping 1.3 billion people in China have some sort of health security, and how 1 billion enjoy some kind of social security. Or explaining the intricate details of China's ethnic policies.
Premier Li, delivering his report, vowed to "forge a strong sense of community among the Chinese people and encourage all of China's ethnic groups to work in concert for common prosperity and development." He did not specifically mention Xinjiang or Tibet. It's an uphill task to explain the trials and tribulations of integrating ethnic minorities into a national project amid non-stop hysteria on Xinjiang, Taiwan, South China Sea and Hong Kong.
Come and join the party
Whatever the Atlanticist West's whims, what matters for the Chinese masses is how the new Five-Year Plan will deliver, practically, what Xi has previously described as "high-quality" economic reform.
Things look good for powerhouses Shanghai and Guangdong - they were already aiming at 6% growth. Hubei -- where COVID-19 cases first appeared -- is actually targeting 10%.
Based on frenetic social media activity, public opinion confidence in the Beijing leadership remains solid, considering a series of factors. China won the "health war" against COVID-19 in record time; economic growth is back; absolute poverty has been eradicated, according to the original timetable; the civilization-state is firmly established as a "moderately prosperous society" 100 years after the founding of the Communist Party.
Since the start of the millennium, China's GDP grew no less than 11-fold. Over the past 10 years, GDP more than doubled, from $6 trillion to $15 trillion. No less than 99 million rural people, 832 counties and 128,000 rural villages were the last ones to be extricated from absolute poverty.
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