There is not much new in this article; it was a summary of the earlier articles and an introduction to a defect with plurality voting that is often called the spoiler effect. IRV proponents often appeal effectively to IRV's ability to avoid the most common example of the spoiler effect. But recent articles in this series show that IRV still is subject to more subtle versions of this defect.
3/7/2017
This article introduces a variation on IRV called IRRV (Instant-runoff removal voting) that would seem to improve on IRV itself. The article's title is a bit ironic, however. IRRV and IRBV both fail to be ranked voting systems though they have a similar look and feel; they both are balanced, however, in that they treat support and opposition as equally important.
4/6/2017
Instant Runoff - Balanced once Again
Building on the previous article, this one considers applying the ideas of IRBV to IRRV instead of to IRV. The conclusion is that nothing is accomplished; we get IRBV again, though through a more devious route.
Arrow's Theorem and Overstatements
As the title suggests, this article brings up the topic of Arrow's Theorem. Though without going into the technical details of that theorem, its essence is outlined, and the question is raised why, despite this work, ranked voting systems remain such a popular idea.
6/13/2018
A First Experience with Ranked Voting
Maine has adopted IRV for most of its elections. This is the story of my first experience using this alternative voting system. The example suggests that IRV may present increasing difficulties for ballot design as the number of candidates increases.
12/10/2018
This article reveals circumstances that are apt to present voters with difficult choices using either approval voting or plurality voting difficult and how these difficulties vanish with BAV.
7/8/2019
Next Page 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8
(Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher).
