Following my publishing an annotated bibliography of expert reports in January 2007, several states conducted additional detailed studies of the security involved in software-driven election systems. This paper serves as a supplement to that January 2007 annotation to include these new studies as well as omitted October 2006 reports. Ohio is currently reviewing the same technology reviewed herein, and an expert report is expected in early 2008.
Optical scan and touch screen voting systems manufactured by Diebold (now known as Premier), Election Systems & Software (ES&S), Hart InterCivic, Sequoia, and Nedap (also known as Liberty) are reviewed.
REPORTS ANNOTATED IN THIS SUPPLEMENT:
California Top-To-Bottom Review of Diebold/Premier, Hart InterCivic, and Sequoia touch screen (DRE) and optical scan systems, 2007
Cleveland State University Diebold’s GEMS Study (Diebold’s Global Election Management System), 2007
Florida Review of Diebold optical scan and touch screen systems, July 2007, plus supplemental review of items fixed, August 2007
Kentucky Voting Expert Letter on Review of Diebold/Premier, Hart InterCivic, and ES&S, 2007
Netherlands, Review of Nedap (marketed in the U.S. as “Liberty”) system, 2006
UConn Voting Technology Research Center, Connecticut, October 2006 review of Diebold optical scans; and July 2007 review of Diebold touch screens.
As with the prior annotation, this one quotes some but not all vulnerabilities reported. Emphasis that appears in this annotation appeared in the original report (except where noted).
As with most prior studies, most of these reports also offer solutions to enhance security at ever-increasing expense to the public. (The Netherlands review herein is an exception, demanding transparent vote counting.) However, if the Pentagon is unable to deter hackers from its computers, surely our less-protected and less-funded election systems are much more vulnerable to attack. There is no doubt that winning elections in the most powerful nation in the world is strong motivation for anyone willing to do what it takes to win.
This supplement should serve to further inform the lay public about the continuing failure of computerized election systems to provide a basis for confidence in reported results.
*Computerized election systems can be remotely accessed and results changed without detection.
*Results transmitted via phone lines can be changed without detection.
*Memory cards containing malicious software can infect an election system countywide, without detection.
*Memory cards can be fraudulently authenticated.
