2007 Technology Tests of Computerized Voting Systems

Documentation was uniformly seriously deficient in alerting officials to security vulnerabilities and the management and training strategies so that election officials could protect the voting systems and accuracy of results.  

The VS vendors varied significantly in the adequacy of the documentation they provided to local election officials. Some documentation was clear and well-written for support; other manuals were vague, contradictory and confusing.  

Poor quality in a vendor’s documentation for election officials can lead to a series of expensive technical services contracts with the vendors, so that a jurisdiction can run the systems.  

Accessibility  

Although some voting systems could be used by some voters with certain disabilities, each of the tested systems has accessibility design limitations that will not allow independent voting by voters with other disabilities.  

Support stands for all the voting systems impeded physical access by most voters in wheelchairs.  

The paper trail printouts of the tested systems cannot be directly read and verified by blind voters, and were also found to be difficult or impossible to read and verify for many other voters with disabilities.  

Impact  

New concerns have arisen over the VS regulatory system for it did not weed out seriously flawed systems. Despite regulatory changes, these studies have raised concerns about the new regulatory system/standards.  

[End of summary extraction] 

Dr. Hoke continues in her email, “We will be summarizing other independent voting systems studies, including those convened by the Secretaries of State in Florida, Connecticut, and Ohio, and by the Kentucky Attorney General, to facilitate these findings also becoming easily accessible to policy makers, election officials, media, and the public.  

“For those concerned with the Diebold/Premier GEMS problems, here's a NY Times article on the Cuyahoga audit and a GEMS capacity problem, plus a relatively short scholarly article on Diebold GEMS software deficiencies, peer-reviewed and presented this summer at a computer science voting systems conference.”  

GEMS Tabulation Database Design Issues in Relation to Voting Systems Certification Standards, Thomas P. Ryan and Candice Hoke, Cleveland State University

Abstract: This paper analyzes the Diebold Election Systems, Inc. election management software (GEMS) using publicly accessible postings of GEMS election databases.

It finds that the GEMS architecture fails to conform to fundamental database design principles and software industry standards for ensuring accurate data. Thus, in election tabulations, aspects of the GEMS design can lead to, or fail to protect against, erroneous reporting of election results. Further, GEMS’ dependence on Microsoft’s JET technology introduces additional risks to data accuracy and security.

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