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December 10, 2007 at 16:08:24

2007 Technology Tests of Computerized Voting Systems

by Rady Ananda     Page 2 of 8 page(s)

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*Voter privacy is lost on systems that use a continuous roll of paper to record voters’ selections, or on systems with radio emanations. 

Given that Cuyahoga County, Ohio “lost” hundreds of memory cards for its Diebold touch screen systems in the May 2006 primary, citizens can have no basis for confidence in results reported on these machines.

The cost of high-tech systems continues to drain scarce public resources, requiring the use of expensive experts, expensive environmental controls and expensive testing.  The level of continued training required for our nation’s poll workers costs far beyond the training for other, more preferred election systems.   

Occam’s Razor applies:  the simplest solution is the best.  Hand-counted paper ballots (HCPB) are used around the world and cost about $4 per voter, while computerized systems in Ohio run as high as $18 per voter. [Ohio’s election costs derived from county Boards of Election annual expense reports provided by the Ohio Secretary of State in response to a public records request. Final “cost-per-voter” derived by dividing the reported total annual expenditure by number of registered voters, and then dividing that quotient by number of elections held in that year in that county.  Ohio counties hold two or three elections every year.] 

But cost and lack of securability are not our only considerations when contemplating HCPB.  The use of any machinery renders a secret vote count, yet transparent vote counting is a necessity of democratic elections.  Josef Stalin warned, “it’s not who votes that counts; it’s who counts the votes.”  Abby Hoffman advised, “Democracy is something you do.”  As more citizens become involved in counting the vote, the more confidence we can begin to have in reported results.  

HCPB represents the best system for democratic elections.  It is the least expensive, the easiest to secure from fraud, and the most transparent.  Paper ballots should be hand-counted at the polling site on election night before all who wish to observe.  The count could be videotaped and web-streamed to ensure greater access in observing the vote count.  Precinct level (polling site) results should be immediately posted at the polling site for public inspection over the next several days, to ensure that county level reporting matches polling site reports.   

As the nation continues to move toward a third questionable presidential election, ignoring the science, the cost, and the objections of informed citizens, we feel grave concern for our democracy.  The solution is simple, though.  Citizens who want to be assured election results are accurate can demand hand-counted paper ballots.  Advocates of transparent vote counting have an ideal opportunity to demand this. 

New York, right now, is facing a lawsuit by the U.S. Department of Justice, seeking to force NY to use these scientifically condemned machines in the 2008 election.  An amicus brief is being contemplated, which offers to hand count the two federal races on the 2008 NY ballot.  Andi Novick, an attorney in New York, will be filing the brief on behalf of the people, since the NY Attorney General represents the interests of the State Board of Elections. 

Novick provides this legal research:

The right of an elector to vote is conferred by the Constitution.... [the elector] is entitled to see that his vote has been given full force and effect.... any method of holding an election which would deprive the electors.... of the right of casting their ballots and having effect given to the votes so cast would plainly be unconstitutional. (Emphasis supplied)  See Deister v Wintermute, 194 NY 99, 108

It is our hope that Americans recognize the only way to ensure honest elections is by our direct observation of them.  As long as we continue to vote on systems which count the vote in secret, we lack democracy.  Without transparent elections, we are no longer a free people.  But by direct participation in a hand-counted process, we quickly move toward the democratic ideal of a free people.   

ANNOTATIONS: 

CALIFORNIA 2007 Top-To-Bottom Review (TTBR) http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm The full Red Team reports are at:

The full Source Code reports are at:

California’s Red Team reports have been summarized by Cleveland State University Center for Election Integrity chief, Dr. Candice Hoke.  Immediately below is Dr. Hoke’s statement from a personal email:

“Full disclosure:  I was the team leader for the TTBR Diebold Documentation assessment.  The TTBR study's lead scientists provided suggestions for this short summary but it is ultimately my work. 

“To reduce over 500 pages to two pages, at least a few important findings -- especially about design flaws not relating to security issues -- had to be sidestepped.” 

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http://www.re-mediaetc.org/

In 2004, Rady Ananda began contributing to the Web, as part of the growing community of citizen journalists. Focusing mainly on elections, her blogs also address religious, gender, sexual and racial equality, as well as environmental issues; and are sprinkled with book and film reviews on various topics. She currently serves as a senior editor at OpEdNews. All material offered here is the property of Rady Ananda, copyright 2006, 2007, 2008. Permission is granted to repost, with proper attribution including the original link. In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act. Tell the truth anyway. Sign this petition: http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/ny_levers_petition

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Bachelors of Science Degree in Computer Science and Business Administration with 25 years of experience working in the Independent Software Vendor Industry.
RunnerBachelors of Science Degree in Computer Science and Business Administration with 25 years of experience working in the Independent Software Vendor Industry.

Excellent article! - One More Vulnerability to Mention

Excellent article! There is one more area of vulnerability that you did not mention in your summary of voting machine problems - Anonymous, unchecked and un-sworn contract programmers who write ballot definition software for each election have the first and best opportunity to hack the vote.

Ballot definition software is constructed for each voting precinct for each specific election and contains all the ballot details for that election. The DRE touch-screen and optical ballot scan machines use the ballot definitions to determine how selections on the touch-screen or paper ballot are interpreted and recorded in the vote database, and how election results are tallied. The BALLOT DEFINITION SOFTWARE is loaded on voting machines in the county elections office warehouse before the machines are even sealed with security tape.

The process of creating the ballot definition and vote tallying software is so complex that most counties contract the work to voting machine vendors. Voting machine vendors themselves do not maintain a staff of programmers large enough to write all the ballot definition software for all the voting precincts of all its county election administration customers across the U.S. Therefore, Voting machine vendors themselves must contract out the programming of ballot definition and vote tallying software for its customers.

Elections Systems & Software, Inc. (ES&S) for example has a consulting partner, DecisionOne, who provides nationwide support services for ES&S’ voting systems including software installations, upgrades, retrofits, repair, and preventive maintenance for 1,700 election jurisdictions in 34 states. Yet other consultants write the last minute ballot definition software.

Who checks the credentials of all these various sub-contractors that write and install the "last minute" ballot software? Who asks if contract programmers also work for a political party or candidate up for election or if they have criminal records or work for a foreign government? Who performs detailed audits of the software they write and install on voting machines just before each election? The frightening answer to all questions is - no one!

Election officials appointed to safeguard election integrity, who have sworn an oath to safeguard election integrity, never see or even test the ballot definition and vote tallying software that is loaded onto their voting machines. Even if local election officials wanted to inspect the ballot software they are not computer scientists; They can neither adequately assess the competence and veracity of local temporary contractor programmers hired to work on voting machines nor review and assess the accuracy of software installed on their eVoting machines. In actuality, local election officials cannot verify that a contractor programmer's work is free of critical coding errors or that they did not nefariously write a few extra lines of software code that activates only on election day to flip votes or rig vote totals on a central tabulator and then self delete at the end of the election day.

DRE touch-screen and optical scan ballot counting machine "physical access security procedures" and "security seals" can never guard against incorrectly written ballot definition software. The frightening truth is ballot software is seldom tested by election office officials and can never be tested by polling place election judges and citizen observers to ensure that the ballot definition software is free of error, either inadvertent or malicious. The more that software is used in the administration of elections, the more we, as a nation, hand control of elections over to anonymous, unchecked and un-sworn contract programmers who may not even be American citizens living and working in the USA. One has to be a U.S. citizen to caste a vote, but anyone in the world can write the ballot software that controls our democracy.

In November 2006 there were 1,142 counties using DRE voting machines and 1,752 counties using optical scanners. This tabulates to 2,894 counties and 161,111 voting precincts that depend on ballot definition software written in weeks and days just before the election last November. That adds up to a lot programmers writing a lot of "last minute" ballot definition software that election officials never visually audited or tested by election officials.

It would be so easy for a political partisan to entice or plant a few willing temporary contractor programmers working with voting machine vendors or directly for key local election offices to stuff the software ballot box as they perform their legitimate programming duties. Even just a few motivated partisan programmers each working independently could easily throw an election and no one would ever know, unless the ballot definition software was inspected line-by-line.

by Runner (9 articles, 34 quicklinks, 47 diaries, 33 comments) on Tuesday, December 11, 2007 at 10:43:46 AM
 


Currently I'm a cartoonist and contributing writer for The New Orleans Levee.
Mr MCurrently I'm a cartoonist and contributing writer for The New Orleans Levee.

If voting could change things - they'd make it illegal.

In a world where what you buy is tagged and tracked, where we are brought-up to ask for a receipt for every transaction, it is just incomprehensible to imagine why we can't do a simple thing like count someones vote.

It has to be obvious to even a half-wit that there is a reason why the powers that be don't want fair elections and it's the same reason we need to fight tooth and nail to see that we do.

by Mr M (4 articles, 0 quicklinks, 9 diaries, 1243 comments) on Tuesday, December 11, 2007 at 12:11:57 PM
 


Currently I'm a cartoonist and contributing writer for The New Orleans Levee.
Mr MCurrently I'm a cartoonist and contributing writer for The New Orleans Levee.

BTW

Again Rady a fantastic read. You're always at the top your game in being one of the best researchers I've had the pleasure to find. Keep it up!

by Mr M (4 articles, 0 quicklinks, 9 diaries, 1243 comments) on Tuesday, December 11, 2007 at 12:15:49 PM
 

 

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