*Voter privacy is lost on systems that use a continuous roll of paper to record voters’ selections, or on systems with radio emanations.
Given that Cuyahoga County, Ohio “lost” hundreds of memory cards for its Diebold touch screen systems in the May 2006 primary, citizens can have no basis for confidence in results reported on these machines.
The cost of high-tech systems continues to drain scarce public resources, requiring the use of expensive experts, expensive environmental controls and expensive testing. The level of continued training required for our nation’s poll workers costs far beyond the training for other, more preferred election systems.
Occam’s Razor applies: the simplest solution is the best. Hand-counted paper ballots (HCPB) are used around the world and cost about $4 per voter, while computerized systems in Ohio run as high as $18 per voter. [Ohio’s election costs derived from county Boards of Election annual expense reports provided by the Ohio Secretary of State in response to a public records request. Final “cost-per-voter” derived by dividing the reported total annual expenditure by number of registered voters, and then dividing that quotient by number of elections held in that year in that county. Ohio counties hold two or three elections every year.]
But cost and lack of securability are not our only considerations when contemplating HCPB. The use of any machinery renders a secret vote count, yet transparent vote counting is a necessity of democratic elections. Josef Stalin warned, “it’s not who votes that counts; it’s who counts the votes.” Abby Hoffman advised, “Democracy is something you do.” As more citizens become involved in counting the vote, the more confidence we can begin to have in reported results.
HCPB represents the best system for democratic elections. It is the least expensive, the easiest to secure from fraud, and the most transparent. Paper ballots should be hand-counted at the polling site on election night before all who wish to observe. The count could be videotaped and web-streamed to ensure greater access in observing the vote count. Precinct level (polling site) results should be immediately posted at the polling site for public inspection over the next several days, to ensure that county level reporting matches polling site reports.
As the nation continues to move toward a third questionable presidential election, ignoring the science, the cost, and the objections of informed citizens, we feel grave concern for our democracy. The solution is simple, though. Citizens who want to be assured election results are accurate can demand hand-counted paper ballots. Advocates of transparent vote counting have an ideal opportunity to demand this.
New York, right now, is facing a lawsuit by the U.S. Department of Justice, seeking to force NY to use these scientifically condemned machines in the 2008 election. An amicus brief is being contemplated, which offers to hand count the two federal races on the 2008 NY ballot. Andi Novick, an attorney in New York, will be filing the brief on behalf of the people, since the NY Attorney General represents the interests of the State Board of Elections.
Novick provides this legal research:
The right of an elector to vote is conferred by the Constitution.... [the elector] is entitled to see that his vote has been given full force and effect.... any method of holding an election which would deprive the electors.... of the right of casting their ballots and having effect given to the votes so cast would plainly be unconstitutional. (Emphasis supplied) See Deister v Wintermute, 194 NY 99, 108
It is our hope that Americans recognize the only way to ensure honest elections is by our direct observation of them. As long as we continue to vote on systems which count the vote in secret, we lack democracy. Without transparent elections, we are no longer a free people. But by direct participation in a hand-counted process, we quickly move toward the democratic ideal of a free people.
ANNOTATIONS:
CALIFORNIA 2007 Top-To-Bottom Review (TTBR) http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm The full Red Team reports are at:
- Diebold Elections Systems, Inc. (.pdf, 498KB) http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/red_diebold.pdf
- Hart InterCivic (.pdf, 376KB) http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/red_hart_final.pdf
- Sequoia Voting Systems (.pdf, 108KB) http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/red_sequoia.pdf
- Diebold Elections Systems, Inc. (.pdf, 561KB) http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/diebold-source-public-jul29.pdf
- Hart InterCivic (.pdf, 573KB) http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/Hart-source-public.pdf
- Sequoia Voting Systems (.pdf, 831KB) http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/sequoia-source-public-jul26.pdf
California’s Red Team reports have been summarized by Cleveland State University Center for Election Integrity chief, Dr. Candice Hoke. Immediately below is Dr. Hoke’s statement from a personal email:
“Full disclosure: I was the team leader for the TTBR Diebold Documentation assessment. The TTBR study's lead scientists provided suggestions for this short summary but it is ultimately my work.
“To reduce over 500 pages to two pages, at least a few important findings -- especially about design flaws not relating to security issues -- had to be sidestepped.”
