My wife and I survived a middle class ordeal over the past few days since a powerful hurricane-force thunderstorm rolled through Potomac on Sunday afternoon. More than 300,000 families lost power in our area as a result of this storm's impact on PEPCO, the privately-owned monopoly power utility in our area.
With two days' outage during Snowmageddon (we had over five feet of snow last winter) and another four days this week, PEPCO has now dropped to 97.14% uptime since January 1, 2010, an increase in failure rate of more than 300:1.
PEPCO's reliability is now about as bad as third world nations during multi-week hurricanes, massive earthquakes, tsunamis, and rampant civil wars.
The "little people" (so-called by the BP CEO) are now perfectly named as the powerless.
Back to my wife and I, my first task was to call in our power outage to the PEPCO emergency line. It was busy. We tried back for fifteen hours before we got a recording. A few hours later, the refrigerator started to smell. You can go about 24 hours before the food will spoil with a modern fridge. I realized that I would need to find a source of dry ice (frozen carbon dioxide) very soon. I looked up "dry ice" in the yellow pages and called the only supplier in a 20-mile radius. They had a line of 200 customers around the block vying for their last few thousand pounds of the precious substance. I went anyway, and waited for three hours only to be turned away as the last shovelfuls were dolled out within sight of the last fifty people in line. The next shipment would be in twelve hours. I came back the next morning and waited in line until I was allowed to buy 20 pounds. It would last for about another 24 hours, since so much of our food had already partially defrosted. All this time, we kept calling PEPCO to no avail. The estimated repair time, as of Wednesday afternoon, was Friday at midnight. I needed to buy more dry ice, and went back for another $42 worth, about 20 pounds.
As an aside, PEPCO used to provide free dry ice distributed at the local elementary schools in our area during outages. They stopped doing it as a budget cutting exercise and as a risk management decision. They knew that their system was becoming so unreliable that it was inevitable that they would be forced to pay millions for dry ice for a million people without power for days.
When I was boy, Grandad used to buy dry ice for our "ice box" fridge in our place. The truck came by twice a week to deliver the dry ice at our doorstep. I think it cost less than 50 cents a week. That was back in the 50s.
It took them half an hour. They started at the wrong feeder. I pointed the guys to the right access point. They finally got our power on.
The upstairs of our house was over 90 F with about 65% humidity by then. Even the second load of dry ice had evaporated!
Modern PEPCO had split into two pieces a few years ago, doubling its expenses for management and G&A, and halving its responsibilities, doubling its costs, and vastly diminishing its services to customers and overall system reliability. PEPCO hasn't built a power plant in decades. It hasn't improved its cables since Nixon was in office. Maryland's Public Service Commission (PSC) which oversees the utility clearly approved all the changes despite the tremendous cost to consumers in terms of reliability, potential economic losses, and exposure to loss of life and property. The senior management of PEPCO's two new pieces are paid nearly 300 times as much as civil servants. It's no wonder that the "Ding Dong School graduates" of Maryland's private utility CEOs and PSC can make such grandiose statements about the reliability of the grid and their customer service.
PEPCO recently stated that their service is "reliable" after one politician on our County Council, Roger Berliner, called them out for their negligence about buried cable.
The DC area has the "third largest tree canopy in the country" among metropolitan areas. After seeing telephone poles snapped off at the base like toothpicks when doubly burdened by power cables and transformers, hanging over our main roads with tree branches draped over them, I'm inclined to agree with Mr. Berliner. How were these geniuses allowed to build out their system using telephone poles to hold up three times the rated weight of the poles in heavily wooded areas? Why were the trees not cut back along the road sides? Why were cables not buried with sensors to activate fault isolation data broadcasts during outages?
Please don't tell me they did not have the money. These utilities pay their risk management executives millions of dollars a year to make decisions.
Folks, I'm just a retired rocket scientist. What do I know about executives and their responsibilities?