By Jason Sibert
Today's world politics makes for a hostile environment in terms of both international law and arms control.
However, some are willing to advocate for a system of international relations where arms control serves as a key point in security. Russia's illegal and disastrous war in Ukraine is turning against the aggressor state, and writer Rose Gottemoeller addressed the issue in her story "NATO and the Future of Arms Control and Strategic Stability in Europe." She correctly pointed out that Russia shut down the main pillar of nuclear strategic stability, the New START Treaty.
She also doesn't understand why Russia wants to lose knowledge of the strategic nuclear force posture of the United States, just as the U.S. launched into its major nuclear triad modernization. Geopolitics drives Russia's behavior, amounting to the Kremlin doing anything it can to move the United States away from its support for Ukraine. One must also remember that the US and Russia (it its Soviet form) engaged in a series of arms control agreements to prevent a disastrous nuclear war in the first Cold War.
Russia's recent belligerent behavior included placing nuclear weapons to Belarus. Despite this, Gottemoeller advocated maintaining lines of communication with Russia to develop avenues to restore nuclear stability and to convey tough deterrence messages. The nuclear negotiating table certainly beats more war!
There are still agreements in force that can serve as a starting point of dialog between the US and Russia - 1971 Accidents Measures Agreement, 1973 Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement, 1987 Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement, 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, and the 1989 Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises Agreement. Gottemoeller said of these agreements: "While none of these instruments compensates for the illegal Russian suspension of the New START Treaty, which is a matter of grave concern in Washington and among the other P 5 members, I'd be interested to know if the Russian Federation has a proposal for regularizing U.S.-Russian consultations under these agreements, or some number of them."
Last fall, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his intention to establish a NATO-style nuclear sharing relationship with Belarus. The deployment goes back on the commitments that Belarus and Russia made under the Trilateral Statement of 1994, - that all nuclear weapons in Belarus would be moved to Russia for redeployment or elimination and that Belarus would embrace the status of a non-nuclear weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
What can be done? Former Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga) and former Obama Administration Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz, of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, suggested a Russian-US dialog on fail-safe mechanisms.
Gottemoeller pointed out that the US set a good example when it comes to safety of the new generation of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe, as the B61-12 gravity bombs have enhanced their protections against nuclear accidents or theft. For instance, the B61-12 contains an enhanced permissive action link system that precludes unlocking and arming of the weapon without a prescribed, discrete code available only after presidential authorization, arming is accomplished through a coded control device that uses a cryptographic algorithm, and the weapon may be "relocked" without a code for enhanced protection.
When the day of victory for Ukraine comes, Russia will still exist, and the West will have to engage with it. Could we start with a dialog on fail-safe mechanisms as suggested by Nunn and Moniz? From there, let's hope we can build a world based on the idea of international law.
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