Sustaining the Threat
The fraudulent "Global War on Terror" had been authorized by Congress, but the physical deployment of military force remained in grave peril. George Bush had made Osama bin Laden's existence and behavior the equivalent of war; if bin Laden were to be killed or taken into custody there would be little if any credible reason for attacking Afghanistan.
Osama bin Laden must at all costs remain at large.
Four days after September 11 the State Department asked Kabir Mohabbat to arrange yet another meeting with the Taliban. He did, and a Taliban entourage was flown to Quetta, Pakistan in two Air Force C-130s. Mohabbat describes the meeting at great length in his memoir .(12)
The head U.S. negotiator was Ron again, the CIA Station Chief. For nine hours the history of the Taliban's offer and the Bush Administration's three rejections was retraced. The senior Taliban official, a man named "Osami," finally said the offer was still open, and delivering bin Laden could be done within a week.
Had there been a police action underway, Osama bin Laden could have been in U.S. custody and awaiting trial in late September, 2001. But this was George Bush's war on terror. Ron the CIA agent replied, "Sir, I don't have a week. You must hand Osama over to me now! Once I leave Quetta, it's all over.....Now! Within 24 hours!"
The U.S. delegation to a person must have known that was abjectly impossible. Bin Laden was buried deep in the mountains of Afghanistan with a sizable army shielding him. Insisting on the impossible was the de facto final rejection of the Taliban's offer. Osama bin Laden would in fact remain at large.
Another of the Afghanis saw this for what it was, and snapped at Ron, "You don't really want Osama. You've had eleven months to get him. Your intention is to destroy the Taliban, and I can assure you if you drop one bomb on Afghanistan you will never find Osama, and if you are thinking of invading Afghanistan you will face the same results as the British and the Soviets."
The meeting ended on that note.
A few days later Mohabbat met with David Donahue, the U.S. consulate general in Islamabad to relay a final plea he'd just received from the Taliban: in spite of the acrimonious meeting in Quetta, the offer still stood for the unconditional surrender of bid Laden. Donahue's response was chilling: "I will convey your message, but I am afraid the train has already left the station." (13)
On October 7, 2001 a carpet of bombs fell on Afghanistan. The Taliban was defeated before the end of December.
The Bush Administration installed Mr. Hamid Karzai as the "Interim Administrator" of Afghanistan. Mr. Karzai had been a Unocal consultant.
The first U.S. envoy to Afghanistan was Mr. John J. Maresca. Mr. Maresca had been a vice president of the Unocal Corporation.(14)
He was succeeded by a formal ambassador, Mr. Zalmay Khalilzad. Mr. Khalilzad had been a Unocal consultant as well.
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