- lower probability of selecting optical scan counts with multiple precincts - procedure slightly unclear - but unit sizes varied
o Probability of detecting outcome-altering miscount is hopelessly low in recounts required under Utah law for races with margins under 1%
o Early voting machines and voting machines used in multi-precinct polling locations have a higher probability of being selected. Absentee ballots and paper optical scan ballots have a much lower probability of being selected for audit, so miscounts in these types would be more likely to be missed.
6. Subverts the Intent of the Legislature and the Public regarding Recounts.
o In races where margins between candidates are less than 1%, these procedures call for a simple audit rather than an entire hand recount.
o A recount is merely a re-tabulation of DRE memory cards (which we saw in Cuyahoga County, were off in 10% of the total votes counted where 72% of the total vote counts were off by at least one vote; and here in Utah, they denied access to do any investigation of our primary election and did not warn voters to use absentee ballots like in Cuyahoga and elsewhere).
7. Lack of Consequences - No Teeth
o No provision or process is provided for expanding the audit when discrepancies are found, and
o No provision for correcting election results when discrepancies are found
Utah's Desert Greens Party and Utah Count Votes believe that the Utah's Election Policy could be improved by taking the following steps:
1. Audits should be conducted by independent auditors.
2. The public should be allowed to observe all audit procedures, including selection and manual vote counts.
3. A sufficient number of vote counts should be audited calculated to assure that any outcome-altering vote miscount would be detected.
4. Any recount should have a 100% manual audit, as per the public and the Utah Legislature's intentions.
5. Diebold optical scan (OS) system counts should be audited separately from touch-screen (TS) counts.
6. Random assignment of auditors and auditors to counts as per the Brennan Center's recommendations should be used.
o Probability of detecting outcome-altering miscount is hopelessly low in recounts required under Utah law for races with margins under 1%
o Early voting machines and voting machines used in multi-precinct polling locations have a higher probability of being selected. Absentee ballots and paper optical scan ballots have a much lower probability of being selected for audit, so miscounts in these types would be more likely to be missed.
6. Subverts the Intent of the Legislature and the Public regarding Recounts.
o A recount is merely a re-tabulation of DRE memory cards (which we saw in Cuyahoga County, were off in 10% of the total votes counted where 72% of the total vote counts were off by at least one vote; and here in Utah, they denied access to do any investigation of our primary election and did not warn voters to use absentee ballots like in Cuyahoga and elsewhere).
7. Lack of Consequences - No Teeth
o No provision or process is provided for expanding the audit when discrepancies are found, and
o No provision for correcting election results when discrepancies are found
Utah's Desert Greens Party and Utah Count Votes believe that the Utah's Election Policy could be improved by taking the following steps:
1. Audits should be conducted by independent auditors.
2. The public should be allowed to observe all audit procedures, including selection and manual vote counts.
3. A sufficient number of vote counts should be audited calculated to assure that any outcome-altering vote miscount would be detected.
4. Any recount should have a 100% manual audit, as per the public and the Utah Legislature's intentions.
5. Diebold optical scan (OS) system counts should be audited separately from touch-screen (TS) counts.
6. Random assignment of auditors and auditors to counts as per the Brennan Center's recommendations should be used.
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