o Random selection process not observable. Does not require transparent random selection (Uses easily manipulated software and no procedures or measures for verifying software are included - could be hacked to avoid certain voting machines.)
o Random selection method is not transparent
o Audit procedures are not publicly observable. The public and even the candidates themselves do not have access to observe any of the procedures (neither the audit, nor the random selections).
o Not Verifiable by the public (see above)
o Results of the audit not publicly released
3. The Audit Results Could be Easily Undetectably Manipulated
o Auditors are not randomly selected and are not randomly assigned to specific counts
o Auditors are not independent - election officials are the auditors.
o Election Officials are free to manipulate the audit results without observation
o Lt. Governor's Office in particular and, depending on who the Lt. Governor's office tells which machines are to be audited during the election, others, could be free to manipulate un-audited vote counts not selected for audit prior to the end of the election (due to possibly selecting which vote counts will be audited prior to the end of the election by the Lt. Governor, and before the announcement of election results and without any public auditable report that the public could use to verify the audit.)
o Early voting machines and voting machines used in multi-precinct polling locations have a higher probability of being selected. Absentee ballots and paper optical scan ballots (which are trivially easy to tamper with) have a much lower probability of being selected for audit, so could be targeted for vote fraud.
4. Not Independent - i.e. not conducted by independent auditors
5. Mathematically Insufficient for Ensuring Election Outcome Integrity
o 1% is insufficient in any close contests or contests with a small number of vote counts
o Differing probabilities of selecting machines -
- lower probability of selecting machines w/ single precincts
o Random selection method is not transparent
o Audit procedures are not publicly observable. The public and even the candidates themselves do not have access to observe any of the procedures (neither the audit, nor the random selections).
o Not Verifiable by the public (see above)
3. The Audit Results Could be Easily Undetectably Manipulated
o Auditors are not randomly selected and are not randomly assigned to specific counts
o Auditors are not independent - election officials are the auditors.
o Election Officials are free to manipulate the audit results without observation
o Lt. Governor's Office in particular and, depending on who the Lt. Governor's office tells which machines are to be audited during the election, others, could be free to manipulate un-audited vote counts not selected for audit prior to the end of the election (due to possibly selecting which vote counts will be audited prior to the end of the election by the Lt. Governor, and before the announcement of election results and without any public auditable report that the public could use to verify the audit.)
o Early voting machines and voting machines used in multi-precinct polling locations have a higher probability of being selected. Absentee ballots and paper optical scan ballots (which are trivially easy to tamper with) have a much lower probability of being selected for audit, so could be targeted for vote fraud.
4. Not Independent - i.e. not conducted by independent auditors
5. Mathematically Insufficient for Ensuring Election Outcome Integrity
o 1% is insufficient in any close contests or contests with a small number of vote counts
o Differing probabilities of selecting machines -
- lower probability of selecting machines w/ single precincts
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