p. 241 "On the night of November 23rd Northern Alliance sources claimed that two Pakistani planes landed in Kunduz under the cover of darkness to extract key Pakistani advisors to the Taliban and several high-ranking Taliban officials. I had no way to confirm this, but wasn't surprised. Pakistan's ISI Directorate had helped create the Taliban and had been a close ally of their government for years"
Tora Bora
p. 275 "From the start it was clear that the men leading this new Afghan force did not have the same desire we did to pursue and destroy al Qaeda. And many of the foot soldiers were followers of local religious leader Maulawi Mohammad Younus Khalis, who had instructed them to allow al-Qaeda to escape.
p. 290 "Day and night, I kept thinking, We needed US soldiers on the ground! We need them to do the fighting! We need them to block a possible al-Qaeda escape into Pakistan! I'd sent my request for 800 US Army Rangers and was still waiting for a response. I repeated to anyone at headquarter who would listen: ˜We need Rangers now! The opportunity to get bin Laden is slipping away!!'
"I'd made it clear in my reports that our Afghan allies were hardly anxious to get at al-Qaeda in Tora Bora. So why was the US military looking for excuses not to act decisively? Why would they want to leave something that was so important to an unreliable Afghan army that'd been cobbled together at the last minute? This was the opportunity we'd hoped for when we launched this mission. Our advantage was quickly slipping away.
p. 296 Tora Bora 12/14/2001 Berntsen is relieved.
(12/9/2001) "I heard Hank clear his throat. ˜We've selected a permanent chief which will allow you to return to your post in South America.'" ˜It's Rich the chief of Station Alex,' Hank answered" ˜He should get to you by the fourteen of December.' That was five days away.
p. 297 "Now that we finally had bin Laden and his al-Qaeda cadres trapped in the White Mountains why was headquarters pulling us out? And why was Washington hesitant about committing troops to get bin Laden? These were the questions that kept me up at night.
(6) Kill Bin Laden by Dalton Fury Excerpts:
St. Martin's Press/ New York - Hardcover edition
Dalton Fury is the nom de plume of the Major in charge of Delta Force on the ground at Tora Bora.
p. XXIV "At the end of the day, the men and women farther up the ladder normally take the word and recommendations of us- the guys on the ground. At some critical times, that did not happen with the complex fight in Tora Bora. Instead, at times, we were micromanaged by higher-ups unknown, even to the point of being ordered to send the exact coordinates of our teams back to various folks in Washington.
"The muhj (Mujahideen) allies turned their guns on our boys to stop an advance.
"When we arrived in Afghanistan in December 2001, the US was pulling troops out of the area in a weird ploy to trick Usama bin Laden while stripping us of a quick reaction force.
"The muhj" routinely left the battlefield when it got dark, at times abandoning our small teams in the mountains.
p. 72 "Then we were slammed by a silly deception plan that had been dreamed up by parties unknown. The majority of the Rangers and our Delta teammates were being sent home! Somebody had decided to try and fool Usama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and the Taliban into thinking that the Joint Special Operations Task Force had left the theater of operations, so that bad buys would let down their guard. The naà vetà ' of that idea still boggles my mind today.
˜Aren't we at war?' we asked. Why were we not pouring all available assets in Afghanistan, rather than withdrawing our strength?
p. 75 "Where were the satellite photos? Where were those maps of the cave entrances?
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