(3) 5/12/2009 Newsweek web exclusive http://www.newsweek.com/id/196818
"Death in Libya" by Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball
(4) The One Percent Doctrine by Ron Suskind Excerpts:
Hardcover edition
p. 58-59
Hank Crumpton headed up the CIA's Afghan campaign from Langley. He briefed the President in late November 2001:
� ���"Crumpton"showed Bush how the Campaign's prime goal- to capture bin Laden- was in jeopardy.� �� �
� ���"Bush asked about the passage to Pakistan. Musharraf had assured the administration "that his troops would seal the passages into Pakistan, the most logical escape route. Crumpton, using his map, showed how the border between the countries was misleading, that the area on the Pakistan side of the line was a lawless, tribal region that Musharraf had little control over. In any event satellite images showed that Musharraf's promised troops hadn't arrived, and seemed unlikely to appear soon.� �� �
� ���"What's more, Crumpton added, the Afghan forces were � ��˜tired and cold and, many of them are far from home.' They were battered from fighting in the south against Taliban forces, and � ��˜they're just not invested in getting bin Laden.'� �� �
� ���"A few days before, on November 26, a force of about 1,200 marines" had settled around Kandahar" Crumpton, in constant contact with the Military's CENTCOM center in Tampa, Florida, had told General Tommy Franks over the past week of the concerns of the CIA's managing operatives in Afghanistan that � ���"the back door was open.� �� � He strongly urged Franks to move the marines to the cave complex. Franks responded that the momentum of the CIA's effort to chase and corner bin Laden could be lost waiting for the troops to arrive; and there was concern marines would be mired in the snowy mountains.� �� �
� ���"As Crumpton briefed the President- and it became clear that the Pentagon had not voiced the CIA's concerns to Bush- he pushed beyond his pay grade. He told Bush that � ���"we're going to lose our prey if we're not careful,� �� � and strongly recommended the marines, or other troops in the region, get to Tora Bora immediately. Cheney said nothing.
Bush, seeming surprised, pressed him for more information. � ��˜How bad off are these Afghani forces really? Are they up to the job?'
� ��˜Definitely not, Mr. President,' Crumpton said. � ��˜Definitely not.'� �� �
p. 74 � ���"Classified CIA reports passed to Bush in his morning briefings of early December, however, warned that � ��˜the back door is open' and that a bare few Pakistani army units were visible gathering near the Pakistani border. None had crossed into Afghanistan, a fierce tribal area Pakistan had always been reluctant to enter.� �� �
(5) Jawbreaker by Gary Berntsen Excerpts:
Crown Publishers / New York - Original Hardcover edition
Gary Berntsen was the CIA station chief in East Afghanistan in 2001. He documented the ineffectiveness of Afghan troops and repeatedly requested 800 Rangers to block the passes between Tora Bora and Pakistan. His requests were denied, and he was relieved in the middle of the operation. Al-Qaeda was allowed to escape to Pakistan.
p. 211 Colonel Alexander was a SF (Special Forces) Colonel working with CIA Special Activities Division for the past two years. � ���"He'd also been part of multiple plans to capture bin Laden during 1999 and 2000, all of which had been canceled at the last minute.� �� �
p. 239 � ���"Two days before the fall of Kabul (on November 12), the London Sunday Times reported that the al-Qaeda leader was seen entering Jalalabad in a convoy of white Toyota trucks surrounded by commandos" At mid-afternoon as US bombs fell on the city"� �� �
� ���""bin Laden"left in a convoy of four wheel drive vehicles.� �� �
� ���"This same convoy of approximately two hundred Toyotas and Land Cruisers was seen two days later passing through the village of Agam two hours south.� �� �
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