"Make no mistake--and this country should not make any mistake on this, nor
anyone in Congress--this is a threat to our country," Hagel said. "This is a
force that is sophisticated, it's dynamic, it's strong, it's organized, it's
well-financed, it's competent."
Similarly, Tehran has made it clear Iran will not tolerate an IS caliphate on its borders, nor will it allow the formation of a Sunni mini-state in Iraq's Anbar province backed by Turkey or one of the Gulf States. Meanwhile Hezbollah is closely following the political, security and field developments in Iraq, and is reportedly conducting intensive meetings with military officials from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps at the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, with summaries of the discussions forwarded to Gen. Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the IRGC. Iran is aware that despite its support for the Iraqi regime's weak forces and the claimed "revitalization" of Iraqi Shia militias, it cannot contain DAASH on its own, and this fact is leading to speculation of a limited US-Iran detente.
One question frequently asked by this observer in the Palestinian camps and in Hamra is why are Sunni Muslims, who in the main, like their Shia brothers and sisters, are distinctively moderate--why are they suddenly and seemingly in great numbers taking such an interest in DAASH's military achievements? And why are so many insisting that the Umma will modify and tame the DAASH jihadist tiger, once the Caliphate returns, as happened to a great extent under the Ottomans?
This observer, like many in this region, has been struck by the Sunni-Shia mutual mistrust and growing antagonism, a rupture that will deeply affect Lebanon's coming war with DAASH. During the spate of bombings over the past year in my largely Shia Hezbollah neighborhood of South Beirut--bombings which left many dead and wounded, including two lovely youngsters, Ali and Marie, from my building on Abbas Mousawi Street--I took strong personal umbrage when a few Sunni friends made outrageous comments like, "They (their countrymen and fellow Muslims in Dahiyeh) deserved it, and let's hope there are many more bombings of the party of Satan by the rebels!"
Despite this appalling hate speech, which appears to be growing these days in
Lebanon, does Hezbollah hold the keys to ending the Sunni-Shia conflict in
Lebanon and defeating DAASH? This observer believes that it does, and that
Hezbollah, in partnership with Lebanese security forces, can and will stop
DAASH, that it will do this by employing some of the elements of a Sunni-Shia
strategy outlined in a written report by the author this week for Hezbollah
leadership.
Parts of the rationale will be presented in Part II of this article entitled: "How Hezbollah can rescue Lebanon from DAASH (IS), substantially reduce the regional Shia-Sunni internecine catastrophe and build Lebanon's economy and its Resistance."
Similarly, Tehran has made it clear Iran will not tolerate an IS caliphate on its borders, nor will it allow the formation of a Sunni mini-state in Iraq's Anbar province backed by Turkey or one of the Gulf States. Meanwhile Hezbollah is closely following the political, security and field developments in Iraq, and is reportedly conducting intensive meetings with military officials from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps at the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, with summaries of the discussions forwarded to Gen. Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the IRGC. Iran is aware that despite its support for the Iraqi regime's weak forces and the claimed "revitalization" of Iraqi Shia militias, it cannot contain DAASH on its own, and this fact is leading to speculation of a limited US-Iran detente.
One question frequently asked by this observer in the Palestinian camps and in Hamra is why are Sunni Muslims, who in the main, like their Shia brothers and sisters, are distinctively moderate--why are they suddenly and seemingly in great numbers taking such an interest in DAASH's military achievements? And why are so many insisting that the Umma will modify and tame the DAASH jihadist tiger, once the Caliphate returns, as happened to a great extent under the Ottomans?
This observer, like many in this region, has been struck by the Sunni-Shia mutual mistrust and growing antagonism, a rupture that will deeply affect Lebanon's coming war with DAASH. During the spate of bombings over the past year in my largely Shia Hezbollah neighborhood of South Beirut--bombings which left many dead and wounded, including two lovely youngsters, Ali and Marie, from my building on Abbas Mousawi Street--I took strong personal umbrage when a few Sunni friends made outrageous comments like, "They (their countrymen and fellow Muslims in Dahiyeh) deserved it, and let's hope there are many more bombings of the party of Satan by the rebels!"
Parts of the rationale will be presented in Part II of this article entitled: "How Hezbollah can rescue Lebanon from DAASH (IS), substantially reduce the regional Shia-Sunni internecine catastrophe and build Lebanon's economy and its Resistance."
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