"By Sept. 16, the I.D.F. was fully in control of West Beirut, including Sabra and Shatila. In Washington that same day, Under-Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger told the Israeli ambassador, Moshe Arens, that 'Israel's credibility has been severely damaged' and that 'we appear to some to be the victim of deliberate deception by Israel.' He demanded that Israel withdraw from West Beirut immediately."
"In Tel Aviv, Mr. Draper and the American ambassador, Samuel W. Lewis, met with top Israeli officials. Contrary to Prime Minister Begin's earlier assurances, Defense Minister Sharon said the occupation of West Beirut was justified because there were '2,000 to 3,000 terrorists who remained there.' Mr. Draper disputed this claim; having coordinated the August evacuation, he knew the number was minuscule. Mr. Draper said he was horrified to hear that Mr. Sharon was considering allowing the Phalange militia into West Beirut. I.D.F. chief of staff, Rafael Eitan, also acknowledged to the Americans that he feared 'a relentless slaughter.'"
All this occurred before the Massacre was launched by Amos Yaron and Ariel Sharon who oversaw the transfer of the killers from East Beirut to the airport just south of Shatila and then into the camps where they immediately sought out the 11 shelters that camp residents had identified the day before to some "foreigners who said they were from a European NGO and would repair the shelters" Rather, they were agents of Mossad.
Just before the slaughter began, and on the evening of Sept. 16, the Israeli cabinet met and was informed that Phalange fighters were entering the Palestinian camps. Deputy Prime Minister David Levy worried aloud: "I know what the meaning of revenge is for them, what kind of slaughter. Then no one will believe we went in to create order there, and we will bear the blame." That evening, word of civilian deaths began to filter out to Israeli military officials, politicians, and journalists, but there was little if any reaction.
At 12:30 p.m. on Sept. 17, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir hosted a meeting with Mr. Draper, Mr. Sharon, and several Israeli intelligence chiefs. Mr. Shamir, having reportedly heard of a "slaughter" in the camps that morning, did not bother to mention it.
The transcript of the Sept. 17 meeting reveals that the Americans were browbeaten by Mr. Sharon's false insistence that "terrorists" needed "mopping up." It also shows how Israel's refusal to relinquish areas under its control, and its delays in coordinating with the Lebanese National Army, which the Americans wanted to step in, prolonged the slaughter.
Mr. Draper opened the meeting by demanding that the I.D.F. pull back right away. Mr. Sharon exploded, "I just don't understand, what you are looking for? Do you want the terrorists to stay? Are you afraid that somebody will think that you were in collusion with us? Just deny it. We denied it." Mr. Draper, unmoved, kept pushing for definitive signs of a withdrawal. Mr. Sharon, who knew Phalange forces had already entered the camps and were slaughtering everyone they came upon, some killers to the point of exhaustion, cynically told Draper, "Stop worrying. Nothing important will happen. Maybe some more terrorists will be killed. That will be to the benefit of all of us." Mr. Shamir and Mr. Sharon finally agreed to gradually withdraw once the Lebanese Army started entering the city--but they insisted on waiting 48 hours (until the end of Rosh Hashanah New Year, which started that evening).
Continuing his plea for some sign of an Israeli withdrawal, Mr. Draper warned that critics would say, "Sure, the I.D.F. is going to stay in West Beirut and they will let the Lebanese go and kill the Palestinians in the camps." Mr. Sharon replied: "So, we'll kill them. They will not be left there. You are not going to save them. You are not going to save these groups of the international terrorism." Mr. Draper responded with shocking words as an employee of the American people: "We are not interested in saving any of these people."
Mr. Sharon declared: "If you don't want the Lebanese to kill them, we will kill them."
Mr. Draper then caught himself, and backtracked. He reminded the Israelis that the United States had painstakingly facilitated the P.L.O. exit from Beirut "so it wouldn't be necessary for you to come in." He added, "You should have stayed out." Mr. Sharon exploded again: "When it comes to our security, we have never asked. We will never ask. When it comes to existence and security, it is our own responsibility and we will never give it to anybody to decide for us." The meeting ended with an agreement to coordinate withdrawal plans after Rosh Hashanah ("head of the year") and the Israelis rushed from the meeting to begin its (the new year's) celebration.
An American Congressman noted at the time the cynical irony of the Begin government allowing forty-eight more hours of slaughtering Palestinians during the Rosh Hashanah two-day celebration, which many believe to be the anniversary of the creation of Adam and Eve and their first actions toward the realization of mankind's role in God's world.
By allowing the argument to proceed on Mr. Sharon's terms, Mr. Draper failed in his duty to his fellow Americans and effectively gave Israel cover to let the Phalange fighters remain in the camps. Years later, Mr. Draper called the massacre "obscene." Just as, no doubt, in the future ex-US officials and former Members of Congress will call the Zionist occupation of Palestine "obscene."
Draper, in an oral history recorded in 2002, recalled telling Sharon: "You should be ashamed. The situation is absolutely appalling. They're killing children! You have the field completely under your control and are therefore responsible for that area." Yet the transcript of Mr. Draper's meeting with the Israelis demonstrates how the United States was unwittingly complicit in the slaughter at Sabra and Shatila.
Ambassador Lewis, now retired, told Mr. Anziska that the massacre would have been hard to prevent "unless Reagan had picked up the phone and called Begin and read him the riot act even more clearly than he already did in August--that might have stopped it temporarily." But "Sharon would have found some other way" for the militiamen to take action, Mr. Lewis added. Nicholas A. Veliotes, then the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, agreed, saying that the killing frenzy was "vintage Sharon," adding, "It is his way or the highway."
On September 18, 1982, Reagan pronounced his "outrage and revulsion over the murders." He said the United States had opposed Israel's invasion of Beirut, both because "we believed it wrong in principle and for fear that it would provoke further fighting." Secretary of State George P. Shultz later admitted that "we are partially responsible" because "we took the Israelis and the Lebanese at their word." He summoned Israeli Ambassador Arens. "When you take military control over a city, you're responsible for what happens," he told him. "Now we have a massacre."
Belated expressions of shock and dismay do nothing for the nearly 3000 butchered or their survivors gathering this week at Shatila camp. And they belie the Americans' failed diplomatic effort during the massacre. The transcript of Mr. Draper's meeting with the Israelis demonstrates how the United States was unwittingly complicit in the tragedy of Sabra and Shatila.
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