JAN 3, 1961: President Eisenhower meets with advisers at 9:30 a.m. to discuss steps to take on Cuba. Regarding the trend of public opinion in Cuba, Assistant Secretary of State Mann argues that support for Castro has gone down from approximately 95% to about 25 to 33%. President Eisenhower offers that he would move against Castro before the 20th (of January) if the Cubans provided him a really good excuse. Failing that, he says, perhaps the U.S. "could think of manufacturing something that would be generally acceptable." (Memorandum of Meeting with the President, January 3, 1961, 1/9/61)
JAN 19, 1961: President Eisenhower meets again with President elect Kennedy and endorses the covert Cuban operation. Eisenhower makes it clear that the project is going very well and that it is the new administration's responsibility to do whatever is necessary to bring it to a successful conclusion. (The White House, Meeting in the Cabinet Room, 9:45 a.m., January 19, 1961)
JAN 25, 1961: President Kennedy meets with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the White House. JAN 27, 1961: Sherman Kent, chairman of the CIA's Board of National Estimates, argues against the view that the Cuban population is eager to stage an uprising against Castro.
Feb. 8, 1961: In a meeting of President Kennedy and his top advisers, Richard Bissell of the CIA reports the CIA plan for landing the brigade has a fair chance of success. Success is defined as an ability to survive, hold ground, and attract growing support from Cubans. At worst, the invaders should be able to fight their way to the Escambray and go into guerrilla action. … President Kennedy presses for alternatives to a full-fledged invasion, supported by U.S. planes, ships and supplies. A memcon written by McGeorge Bundy records Kennedy's question: "Could not such a force be landed gradually and quietly and make its first major military efforts from the mountains then taking shape as a Cuban force within Cuba, not as an invasion force sent by the Yankees?" Kennedy authorizes creation of a small junta of anti Castro leaders to give the Brigade forces some political purpose. (McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum of Meeting with President Kennedy, White House, Washington, February 8, 1961)
FEB 11, 1961: In a memo to the President, Arthur Schlesinger points out that there is no way to disguise U.S. complicity in the plan and "at one stroke, it would dissipate all the extraordinary good will which has been rising toward the new Administration through the world." (Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant to President Kennedy," 2/11/61)
FEB 15, 1961: Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary for Inter American affairs, writes a memo opposing the invasion. Mann notes that the CIA's original plan is based on the assumption that the invasion will inspire a popular an uprising that is unlikely to take place.
MAR 10, 1961: CIA Director Dulles, preparing to meet with President Kennedy, is briefed on the agency's efforts to create a provisional government of exile leaders.
MAR 31,1961: Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles hands a memorandum to Secretary Rusk. Bowles considers the plan profoundly disturbing and a grave mistake.
APR 4, 1961:President Kennedy polls a dozen advisers on whether to go ahead with the Bay of Pigs invasion. After Senator Fulbright outlines his objections, all vote in favor of moving ahead, with only Secretary of State Rusk remaining non-committal. Arthur Schlesinger returns to his office to draft a substantive memorandum outlining why the invasion is "a terrible idea."
Schlesinger sends President Kennedy a comprehensive memo laying out why the CIA invasion will turn into a "protracted civil conflict" that will lead to pressures to send in the marines. The United States, he predicts, will be branded as an aggressor. The President tells Schlesinger, "You know, I've reserved the right to stop this thing up to twenty four hours before the landing. In the meantime, I'm trying to make some sense out of it. We'll just have to see.” (Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 236)
Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy's special counsel, who has not been informed about the Cuban operation, asks the President about the invasion. Kennedy cuts the conversation short: "I know everybody is grabbing their nuts on this," he graphically tells his aide.
APR 14, 1961 From the White House, President Kennedy calls Bissell and says the Saturday air strikes can go forward. He asks how many planes will participate and is told sixteen. "Well, I don't want it on that scale. I want it minimal." Bissell passes the word down for only eight planes to fly. (Bissell, p. 183; Wyden, p.170)
Luis Somoza, the Nicaraguan dictator, comes to the dock to say goodbye to the Cuban Forces about to launch the invasion: "Bring me a couple of hairs from Castro's beard," he reportedly tells them. (Johnson, p.86)
Arthur Schlesinger talks to the President and asks: "What do you think about this damned invasion?" Kennedy reportedly responds: "I think about it as little as possible." (Thomas, p. 251)
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