Muñoz concludes that had Bush exercised more patience and went along with the Chilean alternative, that if it was determined Hussein wasn't cooperating he may have been awarded Security Council approval for the war. But whether Hussein was cooperating seemed to be very arbitrary, and had the Bush Administration been more patient and received the blessing of the Security Council to invade Iraq, the war still would have been launched under false pretenses, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis would still be dead and the Iraq would continue to be a failed state.
Muñoz uses the first Gulf War to contrast the diplomatic styles of the two Bush's. He initially points out Washington's hypocrisy given its historically cozy relationship with Saddam Hussein, while also reminding readers that just a few days before Iraq invaded Kuwait—the stated reason for Washington's military response—the ambassador to Iraq at the time gave a green light to Iraq's military intervention in Kuwait, by telling Hussein that the U.S. had "no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts like your border disagreement with Kuwait."
But then he goes on to use this first war as an example of a "good war" since Bush Sr. was able to get a Security Council resolution and backing of the international community. This again suggests that in his view "UN legitimacy" trumps right and wrong.
As violence in Iraq continued to spiral out of control, and it was becoming apparent that the Bush Administration's occupation in Iraq was becoming an imperial nightmare and quagmire, Washington would return to the UN for help.
"Multilateralism had become both the default U.S. position and a practical requirement for any plan that would begin getting the United States out of the post-invasion quagmire in Iraq…This reversal was not a strategic commitment to multilateralism, but rather an undesired change of course by the Bush Administration, one made necessary by the deepening of the war," Muñoz rightly points out.
But Muñoz falls into the trap of recycling false narratives, like that of the so-called "democratization" of Iraq that has been allegedly taking place since the invasion. He recalls President Bush's Jan. 30, 2005 speech lauding Iraq's recent election and his specific acknowledgement of the vital role that the United Nations had in making it happen.
"The election had signified the launch of an unprecedented democratic process in the country," writes Muñoz.
He notes that Bush again thanked the UN for its pivotal role in the Iraqi election during a speech to the General Assembly a few months later, and requested that the world body "continue to stand by the Iraqi people as they complete their journey to a fully constitutional government."
This is a far departure from the President's (and many other conservatives') view that the UN had made itself "irrelevant" because it failed to endorse the Bush and Blair's unnecessary, devastating and illegal war in Iraq. But in reality this "praise" shouldn't be seen as anything more than words begrudgingly offered by Bush because of the necessity of keeping the UN engaged to help clean up the country-wide mess he made.
The Bush Administration's bullying, bribery, disdain for dissent, spying on allies in the security council and other acts of diplomatic belligerence, in addition to being responsible for destroying the nation of Iraq, also had other costs. According to Muñoz it caused "mistrust and bitterness" among allies, "provoked a loss of American credibility", and "a loss of trust".
"In the future, U.S. allies will very likely not be easily mobilized to war, unless they are provided with hard evidence that a purported threat is indeed and imminent threat," Muñoz writes.
What's striking is that it doesn't occur to Muñoz that this is a position the international community should have had prior, and regardless of Bush's illegal (something Muñoz doesn't strongly assert) war.
He then adds, "But perhaps most important, the United States paid a price in terms of losing authority and respect as the leader of the international community."
Again, Muñoz buys into mythology that "America is a shining city upon a hill whose beacon light guides freedom-loving people everywhere." This is astonishing given Washington's role in Chile's Sept. 11, which saw the military overthrow of the democratic government of Salvador Allende and the decades long murderous regime of Pinochet—the regime which imprisoned Munoz and which Munoz himself worked to get rid of as a dissident. Then there are Washington's countless other crimes in Latin America, involving more coups, death squads, dictators, genocide and economic terrorism.
In the end, Muñoz's book offers readers a valuable behind-the-scenes look at the run up to war by someone intimately involved. He is a critic of unilateralism and a proponent of diplomacy. But where Muñoz falls short is his critique of the UN, or maybe more so his lack of critique of the world body and the asymmetrical power relations that make it impossible to uphold international law and maintain justice.
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez offered some excellent ideas to address these inefficiencies in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2005. Part of the institutional changes he suggested were terminating the veto vote , expanding the Security Council to include newly developed and developing nations, and to strengthen the Secretary General's role.
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