Another neocon mistake was their effort to redeem the American pride lost during Vietnam by launching a war in Iraq. Neo-cons believe that the US would have won in Vietnam, if doves in the media hadn't torpedoed popular support. In the next war, by keeping the media under control, the neo-con's theorized that public perception could be built around a political message: the public impression of victory. As Iraq drags on without any conclusive end to the occupation in sight, the success of the neo-cons' effort at redemption remains doubtful. Victory could have been achieved with the fall of Saddam's regime but for other reasons--Israel, driving up oil prices, or perhaps simple incompetence--the Iraq adventure has devolved into a liability for any incumbents who supported it.
For whatever the reason, the occupation of Iraq continues on and with it, American military resources appear to have been weakened, which limits the credibility of the political leadership. The longer we stay, the less likely the US will emerge with a clean victory, like the one we had after the First Gulf War in 1991. The less glorious the withdrawal, the weaker the neo-con legacy.
As the surge must continue, the militaristic plans developed by the neo-cons have proven their inherent falibility. The surge has been spun for political consumption in the US, where it is largely deemed a success, but does require a large steady stream of men, money, and materiel. If the surge worked, it may need to continue to work: to let the surge wind down would be to encourage a resurgence, and make Iraq into a political liability.
Play it again, Uncle Sam
Russia, labeled the culprit in the invasion of Georgia, will likely face diminishing returns on the investment of hard power as its occupation drags on. In Afghanistan, they faced mujahdeen funded by the US through Pakistan. In what was arguably the US' greatest insurgency led against communism, the Afghans fought back over time and routed even the mighty Russian legions. Yet the legacy was ugly; al Qaeda began as a list of anti-Soviet mujhadeen assembled by Western intelligence services. Pakistan's ISI was the routing through which the CIA funded the mujahdeen; later the ISI became a vehicle through which al Qaeda financed the aerial portion of the 9/11 attacks. Every bit of meddling, even the "successes" like the surge, seems to entangle the US in a sticky web of double-dealing and intrigue.
The motives for occupying Afghanistan may lie in a neo-con-inspired fantasy to make up for the Vietnam failure. The neo-cons have lost big on Iraq, at least if their goal all along was purely political--to emerge with a clean victory. Like a bettor eager to double down, Cheney and others are eager to expand the scope of the conflict to other enemies--not coincidentally those of Israel, with whose Zionist cause any upcoming President appears to have been indoctrinated. Like the Russians, the US will likely face more resistance, and the chances of a clear victory shrink with the passage of time.
NATO is there to help, but the mission is testing the strength of the alliance, which hinges on the intersection of mutual interests rather than the imperial aspirations of its strongest member. The antiwar movement, largely ineffective in the US, is surely a greater threat across the Atlantic--supporting the US mission in Afghanistan could become a major political liability for EU incumbents.
Grown dependent on the continued use of hard power, the US simply lacks the global stature which makes projecting soft power effective. The go-it-alone approach taken in Iraq, scorning diplomacy and creating a coalition in name only, alienated many other nations who might have once been more open to US advances. In Georgia, the US can bring very little hard power to bear, especially considering how strong the Russians are militarily, in their back yard. Quick we were to flaunt our lift capabilities, by rushing Condi Rice and humanitarian supplies in, but these measures are simply overwhelmed by the exercise of so much Russian hard power, which also will degrade in potency over time, kind of like what we've seen in Iraq.
As romantic as the notion of a world-dominating US empire might seem, America is not as strong relative to the rest of the world as the Romans or Greeks were in their heyday. To be a viable empire, the US can't behave like some superhuman policeman--constantly intervening here and meddling there, especially nowhere near the resurgent Russian bear. Making things worse is the abandonment of international treaty law, which had it been followed may have made greater support for the American missions far more easier to retain and attract. Guantanamo's embrace of torture has also contributed to America's negative image.
The most effective expansion of empires leverages mutual cooperation, diplomacy, rather than conquest, which while instilling shock-and-awe 'round the world' greatly losses its efficacy over time.
A History of Empire
Empires have always had spheres of influence over which they've exerted their authority. The sphere was geographical, with military influence sufficient to deter upstarts and rival empires from entering the sphere of influence. Often the perceived strength of the empire was reflected in the geographical size of the sphere, but influence could be extended over an area through cultural ties, religion, and economic interests.
A key determinants for an empire's survivability is its willingness to embrace alien cultures that come under its control as it expands. Undoubtedly the Roman Empire greatly extended its time by bestowing Roman citizenship on its soldiers, who would receive land grants in the border lands of the empire from which they came. Then, when barbarians would gather on the periphery of empire, they'd have to face retired Roman legionnaires first, who could easily be recalled to duty very close to the front.
An empire has no need to control the day-to-day affairs of one area but is rather concerned with broader issues that effect many areas. It was often convenient to let much of the empire to be ruled by people sympathetic to the empire, who would take vows of loyalty and extend tribute in the form of slaves, gold, or precious goods to the empire.
Some empires were largely mercantile--based on the transport and selling of commercial products. The Venetians and Dutch were especially skilled at converting navigational prowess and well developed merchant fleets into great sums of wealth for the empire. In both cases, a strong navy was essential to the task of protecting trade from pirates. Military force by these countries was largely used to protect commercial interests, and deter rivals.
The roots of empire are largely economic. Traditionally, raw goods have been shipped from the less developed countries at the periphery of empire to the more developed empire, where they'd be converted into finished goods by skilled craftsman. This model of economic co-dependency has shifted quite considerably in recent times, as lower wage rates have driven jobs out to underdeveloped nations. In successful empires, many indigenous people became quite skilled, multicultural, and enjoyed full citizenship--contributing to the growth and stability of the empire.
For whatever the reason, the occupation of Iraq continues on and with it, American military resources appear to have been weakened, which limits the credibility of the political leadership. The longer we stay, the less likely the US will emerge with a clean victory, like the one we had after the First Gulf War in 1991. The less glorious the withdrawal, the weaker the neo-con legacy.
As the surge must continue, the militaristic plans developed by the neo-cons have proven their inherent falibility. The surge has been spun for political consumption in the US, where it is largely deemed a success, but does require a large steady stream of men, money, and materiel. If the surge worked, it may need to continue to work: to let the surge wind down would be to encourage a resurgence, and make Iraq into a political liability.
Play it again, Uncle Sam
The motives for occupying Afghanistan may lie in a neo-con-inspired fantasy to make up for the Vietnam failure. The neo-cons have lost big on Iraq, at least if their goal all along was purely political--to emerge with a clean victory. Like a bettor eager to double down, Cheney and others are eager to expand the scope of the conflict to other enemies--not coincidentally those of Israel, with whose Zionist cause any upcoming President appears to have been indoctrinated. Like the Russians, the US will likely face more resistance, and the chances of a clear victory shrink with the passage of time.
NATO is there to help, but the mission is testing the strength of the alliance, which hinges on the intersection of mutual interests rather than the imperial aspirations of its strongest member. The antiwar movement, largely ineffective in the US, is surely a greater threat across the Atlantic--supporting the US mission in Afghanistan could become a major political liability for EU incumbents.
Grown dependent on the continued use of hard power, the US simply lacks the global stature which makes projecting soft power effective. The go-it-alone approach taken in Iraq, scorning diplomacy and creating a coalition in name only, alienated many other nations who might have once been more open to US advances. In Georgia, the US can bring very little hard power to bear, especially considering how strong the Russians are militarily, in their back yard. Quick we were to flaunt our lift capabilities, by rushing Condi Rice and humanitarian supplies in, but these measures are simply overwhelmed by the exercise of so much Russian hard power, which also will degrade in potency over time, kind of like what we've seen in Iraq.
As romantic as the notion of a world-dominating US empire might seem, America is not as strong relative to the rest of the world as the Romans or Greeks were in their heyday. To be a viable empire, the US can't behave like some superhuman policeman--constantly intervening here and meddling there, especially nowhere near the resurgent Russian bear. Making things worse is the abandonment of international treaty law, which had it been followed may have made greater support for the American missions far more easier to retain and attract. Guantanamo's embrace of torture has also contributed to America's negative image.
The most effective expansion of empires leverages mutual cooperation, diplomacy, rather than conquest, which while instilling shock-and-awe 'round the world' greatly losses its efficacy over time.
A History of Empire
Empires have always had spheres of influence over which they've exerted their authority. The sphere was geographical, with military influence sufficient to deter upstarts and rival empires from entering the sphere of influence. Often the perceived strength of the empire was reflected in the geographical size of the sphere, but influence could be extended over an area through cultural ties, religion, and economic interests.
A key determinants for an empire's survivability is its willingness to embrace alien cultures that come under its control as it expands. Undoubtedly the Roman Empire greatly extended its time by bestowing Roman citizenship on its soldiers, who would receive land grants in the border lands of the empire from which they came. Then, when barbarians would gather on the periphery of empire, they'd have to face retired Roman legionnaires first, who could easily be recalled to duty very close to the front.
An empire has no need to control the day-to-day affairs of one area but is rather concerned with broader issues that effect many areas. It was often convenient to let much of the empire to be ruled by people sympathetic to the empire, who would take vows of loyalty and extend tribute in the form of slaves, gold, or precious goods to the empire.
Some empires were largely mercantile--based on the transport and selling of commercial products. The Venetians and Dutch were especially skilled at converting navigational prowess and well developed merchant fleets into great sums of wealth for the empire. In both cases, a strong navy was essential to the task of protecting trade from pirates. Military force by these countries was largely used to protect commercial interests, and deter rivals.
The roots of empire are largely economic. Traditionally, raw goods have been shipped from the less developed countries at the periphery of empire to the more developed empire, where they'd be converted into finished goods by skilled craftsman. This model of economic co-dependency has shifted quite considerably in recent times, as lower wage rates have driven jobs out to underdeveloped nations. In successful empires, many indigenous people became quite skilled, multicultural, and enjoyed full citizenship--contributing to the growth and stability of the empire.
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