Perhaps it would take a 20 point spread for you to vote for the lesser-of-two-evils.
Of course, the logic of lesser-of-two-evilism should take into
account not just the two leading candidates but also third-party
candidates, their chances of winning, and, most importantly, the effect
of our votes on future elections. Such considerations greatly complicate
the reasoning and weighing of effects.
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If the third-party candidate has a decent chance of winning, then it might be a risk worth taking to vote for her.
In 2000 and in 2016, everyone knew there was virtually no chance that Nader or Stein would win.
But someone can argue it's better to vote for a third-party candidate because that will send a message to the future: we will not vote for an evil candidate -- at least not one who scores less than, say, 45.
Such reasoning is like a sacrifice: I'm willing to suffer for the next four years (or next 40 years, realistically, given the judicial picks) so that future politicians will think twice before crossing a line.
Such a strategy might work. It can be quite costly. It's not clear that future politicians will hear the message. I suppose it's like the decision a general in a war needs to make: should I sacrifice these troops to set us up for victory in the future.
There's yet another way to view lesser-of-two-evilism. Instead of looking at the consequences of your vote, look at the virtue of the candidates. In such a case, one could have a principle: I will not vote for candidates who are less than, say, 40 on the evil scale, no matter how evil the more evil candidate is. Such a view of voting largely ignores consequences. It's not a view that I support. How about you?
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