Turkish Procurement
According to IAEA investigators, the nuclear hardware supplied by Turkey to the AQ Khan ring - including 7000 centrifuge motors - "could be used in manufacturing enough enriched uranium to produce 7 nuclear weapons a year."
In fact, the entire deal to supply Libya with a nuclear weapons program began in Turkey with a meeting in 1997 involving AQ Khan, his Chief Operating Officer BSA Tahir, and Libyan representatives.
The known Turkish suppliers to the network, Selim Alguadis and Gunes Cire, were not indicted for their criminal participation in the ring, and their companies, EKA and ETI Elektroteknik, continue to operate freely today.
Further, Turkish businessman Zeki Bilmen and his US based company Giza Technologies, was caught supplying nuclear hardware to Pakistan's military program in 2003 via South African-based Israeli Asher Karni.
Bilmen was also overheard on wiretaps translated by Sibel Edmonds prior to 2002 organizing nuclear shipments, apparently with members of the Turkish and Israeli military and diplomatic community in Washington DC. According to Sibel, Bilmen was shipping product to and from other hotspots in the Khan/Tahir network such as Turkey, Dubai, South Africa and Spain.
Zeki Bilmen was not indicted, and his company continues to operate freely.
Marco Tinner, a member of the Tinner family that was effectively pardoned by the Bush administration's destruction of evidence, was also recommended for indictment in Turkey in 2005. He faced 32 years in prison in Turkey but that case also appears to have disappeared in the same manner as the Swiss prosecution case.
A Turkish Bomb?
Although there has been no official proof that Turkey is actively building a nuclear weapons, some experts on Turkey's nuclear program have recounted their support, suspicious that the energy program is a cover for a weapons program. In 2006, Mustafa Kibaroglu, a nuclear proliferation expert in Turkey told the Washington Post:
Of course, David Sanger and William Broad chose not to mention any of this in their article despite the direct link to the Tinner case, preferring to cherry-pick information in order to facilitate the agenda of their government masters. This pattern is consistent with the whitewashing of Turkey's involvement in nefarious activity. Turkey's role in terrorism is a "best kept secret," Turkey's role in narcotics smuggling is a 'best kept secret,' and with the able assistance of the New York Times, Turkey's involvement in the nuclear black market will remain another 'best kept secret.'
Dubai
According to the US State Department, Dubai is a major center for the trans-shipment of narcotics and the associated money-laundering. The same is true for nuclear hardware and the laundering of the profits of the nuclear black market. It is also considered a major US ally.
Chief Operating Officer of the nuclear procurement ring, BSA Tahir, was based in Dubai, as was one of his main suppliers, Briton Peter Griffin. Most of the hardware supplied to the network was sent to Dubai, and sometimes via Turkey, on its way to the end-customers. Nuclear hardware from the Tinners, and also Turkish operatives, Alguadis and Cire, was sent to Dubai from where it was dispatched to Libya on board the BBC China.
Interestingly, the official report regarding the exposure of the AQ Khan / Libya deal appeared to imply that the shipments from Turkey had some semi-official blessing, noting that "it is surprising" that the consignment from Turkish businessman Gunes Cire to Libya was "allowed without any action" and also that the consignment from Selim Alguadis "arrived in Libya without any obstruction and this is unusual."
Pardoned
As I documented in my previous article, virtually all of the participants in this procurement ring have been allowed to walk free, without paying any penalty for these very serious crimes. The same can be said for the different countries that actively supported the network, such as Turkey and Dubai - as well as the US, the UK, and Pakistan. Iran is the only country feeling the heat. Why is that?
Summary
By focusing on, and misrepresenting, the Iranian angle, Broad and Sanger again have shown themselves to be lapdogs for the US government. For one reason or other, none of them flattering, Broad and Sanger chose to selectively sanitize the role of other countries who are more culpable than Iran in matters of nuclear weapons proliferation.
Whatever the reason for the Times to provide the government's preferred spin on the case, David Sanger and William Broad will remain in the Judy Miller Hall of Fame.
---------------
Notes in the margin:
I was interviewed by Scott Horton on this topic yesterday. The interview can be downloaded here. An June interview regarding the Tinners is here.
According to IAEA investigators, the nuclear hardware supplied by Turkey to the AQ Khan ring - including 7000 centrifuge motors - "could be used in manufacturing enough enriched uranium to produce 7 nuclear weapons a year."
In fact, the entire deal to supply Libya with a nuclear weapons program began in Turkey with a meeting in 1997 involving AQ Khan, his Chief Operating Officer BSA Tahir, and Libyan representatives.
The known Turkish suppliers to the network, Selim Alguadis and Gunes Cire, were not indicted for their criminal participation in the ring, and their companies, EKA and ETI Elektroteknik, continue to operate freely today.
Further, Turkish businessman Zeki Bilmen and his US based company Giza Technologies, was caught supplying nuclear hardware to Pakistan's military program in 2003 via South African-based Israeli Asher Karni.
Bilmen was also overheard on wiretaps translated by Sibel Edmonds prior to 2002 organizing nuclear shipments, apparently with members of the Turkish and Israeli military and diplomatic community in Washington DC. According to Sibel, Bilmen was shipping product to and from other hotspots in the Khan/Tahir network such as Turkey, Dubai, South Africa and Spain.
Zeki Bilmen was not indicted, and his company continues to operate freely.
Marco Tinner, a member of the Tinner family that was effectively pardoned by the Bush administration's destruction of evidence, was also recommended for indictment in Turkey in 2005. He faced 32 years in prison in Turkey but that case also appears to have disappeared in the same manner as the Swiss prosecution case.
A Turkish Bomb?
Although there has been no official proof that Turkey is actively building a nuclear weapons, some experts on Turkey's nuclear program have recounted their support, suspicious that the energy program is a cover for a weapons program. In 2006, Mustafa Kibaroglu, a nuclear proliferation expert in Turkey told the Washington Post:
"I'm not supporting Turkey's nuclear energy program anymore because I'm not clear about what the real intention is. Let's put it that way."
Of course, David Sanger and William Broad chose not to mention any of this in their article despite the direct link to the Tinner case, preferring to cherry-pick information in order to facilitate the agenda of their government masters. This pattern is consistent with the whitewashing of Turkey's involvement in nefarious activity. Turkey's role in terrorism is a "best kept secret," Turkey's role in narcotics smuggling is a 'best kept secret,' and with the able assistance of the New York Times, Turkey's involvement in the nuclear black market will remain another 'best kept secret.'
Dubai
According to the US State Department, Dubai is a major center for the trans-shipment of narcotics and the associated money-laundering. The same is true for nuclear hardware and the laundering of the profits of the nuclear black market. It is also considered a major US ally.
Chief Operating Officer of the nuclear procurement ring, BSA Tahir, was based in Dubai, as was one of his main suppliers, Briton Peter Griffin. Most of the hardware supplied to the network was sent to Dubai, and sometimes via Turkey, on its way to the end-customers. Nuclear hardware from the Tinners, and also Turkish operatives, Alguadis and Cire, was sent to Dubai from where it was dispatched to Libya on board the BBC China.
Interestingly, the official report regarding the exposure of the AQ Khan / Libya deal appeared to imply that the shipments from Turkey had some semi-official blessing, noting that "it is surprising" that the consignment from Turkish businessman Gunes Cire to Libya was "allowed without any action" and also that the consignment from Selim Alguadis "arrived in Libya without any obstruction and this is unusual."
Pardoned
As I documented in my previous article, virtually all of the participants in this procurement ring have been allowed to walk free, without paying any penalty for these very serious crimes. The same can be said for the different countries that actively supported the network, such as Turkey and Dubai - as well as the US, the UK, and Pakistan. Iran is the only country feeling the heat. Why is that?
Summary
By focusing on, and misrepresenting, the Iranian angle, Broad and Sanger again have shown themselves to be lapdogs for the US government. For one reason or other, none of them flattering, Broad and Sanger chose to selectively sanitize the role of other countries who are more culpable than Iran in matters of nuclear weapons proliferation.
Whatever the reason for the Times to provide the government's preferred spin on the case, David Sanger and William Broad will remain in the Judy Miller Hall of Fame.
---------------
Notes in the margin:
I was interviewed by Scott Horton on this topic yesterday. The interview can be downloaded here. An June interview regarding the Tinners is here.
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