"Russia conducted the flight test program in a way that appeared purposefully designed to disguise the true nature of their testing activity as well as the capability of the 9M729 missile."
Coats makes careful use of estimative language, in particular the terms "assesses" and "appeared," which clearly indicate that the American allegations are not absolute, but rather a matter of analytical supposition. This conclusion is furthered by Coats' concluding statement: "Russia probably assumed parallel developmenttested from the same siteand deployment of other cruise missiles that are not prohibited by the INF Treaty would provide sufficient cover for its INF violation."
What is clear from Coats' statement is that Novator was conducting simultaneous tests of multiple similar systems. Open source information confirms that during the timeframe in question, it was working on upgrading the guidance and control systems of the 3M14 "Kaliber" sea-launched cruise missile which has a range of well over 2,500 miles, but as a sea-launched system is not covered by the INF Treatyas well as the 9M729, a ground-launched missile. As such, it is plausible that Russia tested the new guidance and flight control system on the 3M14 missile, and then tested the same system on the 9M729 (guidance systems are not covered by the INF Treaty).
It appears that the 9M729 missile that is being deployed by Russia is likely not capable of ranges that violate the INF Treaty. The Russians have provided a static display of the weapon that showed the propulsion system of the 9M729 to be identical to that of the 9M728 missile, which operates at ranges below the threshold set by the INF. In fact, the larger warhead and increased size of the guidance and flight control systems on the 9M729 result in its range being less than the 9M728. Russia has indicated that it is willing to go furtherperhaps removing the missile from its sealed launch canister for a more technical evaluation by U.S. specialiststo reinforce the 9M729's compliance.
The U.S. has refused to participate in such an exercise. Andrea Thompson, the current under secretary for arms control and international security, met with her Russian counterparts in January 2019 prior to the final decision being made to withdraw from the INF Treaty.
"I was there to listen," Thompson noted, "but my objective and the message was clear from the administration that Russia must return to full and verifiable compliance with the INF Treaty."
According to Thompson, the only acceptable solution was "the verifiable destruction of Russia's noncompliant missile system."
Thompson's Russian opposite, Sergei Rybokov, responded by noting,
"Clearly, the United States was no longer interested in obtaining our substantive response to their questions. This once again showed us that our efforts at transparency have no impact on the decisions taken by the United States, and that they have taken all their decisions a long time ago and are only waiting for Russia to plead guilty."
"A high degree of confidence is required before the United States will publicly charge another party with violation of an international agreement." The words of Thomas Graham hang heavy in the air today. There is nothing about America's case against Russia that meets that standard. Instead, the U.S. seems intent on following in the same path as previous intelligence failures in Iraq and Iran. This time, however, the consequences will resonate beyond regional chaos. By killing the INF Treaty based on flawed intelligence, the U.S. risks global annihilation.
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