- Implementation: This is probably the trickiest part in Merkel's project. Turkey has not done anything since 2011 to stem the migration flow towards its own territory and towards the EU. There are probably some humanitarian reasons for this behaviour, but foreign diplomats and experts in Ankara and the region claim that the Turkish state does not have the necessary infrastructure to perform the gendarme and 'prison-guard' jobs. It employs large numbers of agents who could act, but these have no training or motivation to do the necessary diligently. This has been witnessed after the 3-billion deal was agreed in November. No results have been obtained so far in reducing sea crossings to the Greek islands--the numbers for January and February 2016 are in fact higher than those for the same period of 2015! The litmus test will, obviously, take place in the spring, summer and autumn of this year. Data from all official sources indicate that the peak last year was in September and October. It would therefore be premature to judge the effectiveness of the agreement before next November.
- Logic: The rationale behind the proposed agreement is that the one-to-one exchange should break the current pattern of people outflows, because the 'business model' of the traffickers will collapse, since migrants will know that if they venture to the Greek islands, they will be returned to Turkey and will not be resettled legally to the EU, as incumbent political refugees camped in Turkey will be chosen instead. Simple? Yes, but maybe simplistic. First, it is not certain that refugees will get the full story in advance and will make a rational decision. More important, perhaps: They have so far been taking huge risks, for themselves and families, being aware of the chances of perishing in the Aegean Sea or on the long march to Germany. They are desperados, so they will venture to Kos and Lesbos and to the other islands regardless of the 'broken business model'.
- Conflict of interests: There is relatively low likelihood that the traffickers will be deterred by the collapse of their 'business model'. In fact, the new difficulties may give them incentives to find new ways to get through or around the NATO naval blockade implemented a few weeks ago, and to increase their passage fees, since they will be exposed to additional risks. There are currently more than 30,000 traffickers, according to official estimates. The smaller and less daring ones will cease their activities. But the hungrier, more entrepreneurial, hawkish ones will continue, betting on the complicity of officials on both sides of the Aegean, and on the humanitarian feelings and compassion of the coast and island populations. Those who, outside of the human traffickers, make good money today will not easily drop the ball. Some of them have political clout among their local communities (which often benefit from the spillover effects of illegal transit) and they will not be ignored by the political parties with which they are affiliated.
- Transparency: What will be the mechanisms for monitoring implementation of the agreement and use of the funds disbursed by the European citizens? It was unclear in the previous deal, and is even foggier now, before we see the full text of the new transaction. The official document, if approved next Tuesday, will refer to future 'action plans' to be proposed by the Turkish government and to a vague joint supervisory body. The Commission has a stark record in being lax when it monitors aid given to candidate members. There is no reason to believe that it will become more competent, efficient, diligent, and transparent now.
Negotiating skills: The EU Council provides an excellent case for what negotiators should not do! They accepted too quickly the first plan, the 3 billions, and have equally consented in principle to the second plan, the 6 billions. No collective reaction to the 'revised opportunity' has been recorded, except for the Visegrad four members. Worse, the de-facto leaders of the Union--Merkel and French President Franà §ois Hollande, escorted by Juncker and Tusk--have not displayed any signs of displeasure for Davutoglu's 'surprise party' last Monday night. Not even in order to save face vis-a-vis their respective national citizens! Merkel, at the end of the summit, said the new offer was a better one than no deal at all. This reminds of the appeasing attitude of a head of government in the 1930s, who postponed disaster by a couple of years, but could not avoid it altogether, because of his softness and eagerness to avoid personal conflict. Strong and single-minded negotiators, who bargain on positions and not on principles, always exploit such weaknesses and obtain what they want. Merkel, and the other heads of government, who have aligned their actions with hers, seem to also be ignorant of the cultural aspects that impact a difficult negotiation. The discussions are held in Brussels, but the mind-set of their interlocutors is in the Middle East. The Europeans could benefit from a crash course on cross-cultural bargaining, or on dealing with difficult people. They still have the time--it is amazing how much one can learn in one weekend!
But Merkel does not have a weekend to spare. Especially not the coming one: There will be on 13 March elections in three German states--Baden-Wurttenberg, Rheinsland-Palatinate and Saxony-Anhalt. The local populations are very sensitive to the migration crisis and analysts predict serious gains among the voters by hard-core right and left wing parties to the detriment of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Merkel's party.
By the EUCO Summit on 17-18 March we shall know whether the German Chancellor has been able to sell to her constituency the camel as a horse. If she does, then her 27 colleagues may buy in it too.
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