(Note: Part One of "The Bush/Cheney Holocaust in Iraq: Criminality, Immorality, Incompetence and Desperation examined the criminality and immorality underlying the Bush/Cheney regime's invasion of Iraq (see http://www.walter-c-uhler.com/Reviews/criminal.html ). Part Two, examined the disasters that could have been avoided, except for the gross incompetence with which the invasion was conducted (see http://www.walter-c-uhler.com/Reviews/incompetence.html ). Part Three, below, examines the desperation, which now compels various political actors to contemplate drastic action before the Bush/Cheney regime leaves office.)
Part Three: Desperation unto Bombing Iran?
Thanks to mid-term congressional elections in November 2006 -- during which Americans delivered a crushing rebuke to the Bush/Cheney regime's handling of its war in Iraq -- and thanks to the report of the Iraq Study Group, which was delivered a month later, the cowards in the White House finally admitted that a "new approach" was needed in Iraq.
Cowards? Yes! As more than one observer has lamented about this pair of jokers: "People don't Change." Neither Bush nor Cheney opposed the war in Vietnam, but neither proved brave enough or patriotic enough to volunteer to fight for their country there, when they had the chance. True to form, in April 2004, a full year into his debacle in Iraq, when our cowardly president was asked whether his administration had made any mistakes, the supposedly honest, forthright and swaggering Bush said he could not think of any.
In fact, neither Bush nor Cheney possessed the courage to level with Americans about what they really had in mind for Iraq. And neither has demonstrated the courage to stand up, like a man, and take responsibility for the criminality, immorality and incompetence that has produced the holocaust in Iraq. Moreover, cowardice richly explains how Bush could dare to challenge the insurgents to "Bring 'em on" in Iraq -- but from the safety of the White House in Washington D.C.
Cowardice also explains Bush's recent commutation of Scooter Libby's thirty-month prison sentence. Libby simply knows too much about the Bush/Cheney regime's criminality, immorality and incomptence. Thus, the commutation is a part of a cowardly coverup.
Finally, cowardice also explains why Bush and Cheney ignored advice from their senior military leaders, which recommended against an escalation of the war in Iraq. Simply recall Colin Powell's June 10, 2007 statements to Tim Russert on Meet the Press. When Russert asked Powell why his predicted troop drawdown in early 2007 didn't occur, Powell responded: "A different choice was made by the Prsident."
Elaborating, Powell asserted: "The President received advice from his military advisers last fall that said, do not send more troops." Moreover, "Gen. Abizaid went before Congress, the commander of Central Command, and said he had consulted with all of division commanders in Iraq and all of the senior commanders, and non of them wanted to send additional troops." [Robert Parry, "Powell Belies 'Commander Guy' Bush," consortiumnews.com, June, 10, 2007]
Taking such advice would have implied that their war was lost, a matter Bush and Cheney are afraid to admit. So, instead, the cowards sucker-punched the American electorate, the Iraq Study Group and the U.S. military by ordering a desperate, last ditch escalation of the war, which they called a "surge." Thus, more U.S. soldiers and innocent Iraqis are destined to die for their cowardice.
(Inveterate liar and hypocrite that he is, Bush would subsequently criticize Democrats for attempting to manage the war from Washington, while noting how he listens to his commanders.)
Desperately seizing upon another pipe-dream of the neocons, the Bush/Cheney regime touted the "surge" as a measure which would stamp down sectarian violence in Baghdad long enough to allow the food-fighting politicians in Iraq's national government sufficient time to reconcile their differences on such critical issues as the distribution of oil revenues, the holding of local elections and the reversal of the de-Baathification process.
Astute analysts, such as Anthony Cordesman, immediately saw the flaws in this desperate move: "Winning security control of the city (of Baghdad) and losing Iraq's 11 other major cities and countryside to Iraq's sectarian and ethnic factions is not victory (in any strategic sense), it is defeat." Moreover, U.S. policymakers have "completely failed to set forth a strategy and meaningful operational plan for dealing with Iraq as a country even if it succeeds in Baghdad." [Martin Sieff, "Iraq Surge Strategy Slammed," UPI, Feb. 22, 2007]
As if to demonstrate the accuracy of Cordesman's observation, on July 7, 2007, a suicide truck bomber in the village of Amerli killed at least 105 people and injured some 200 more, "leading to fears that insurgents who had fled intense military operations in Baghdad and Diyala are turning to more vulnerable targets nearby." [New York Times July 8, 2007] In fact, the U.S. simply does not have sufficient boots on the ground to prevent insurgents from exercising classical insurgency strategy - tactical retreat in the face of massed firepower, in order to wreak havoc elsewhere.
The violence has surged to such an extent - in spite of Bush's "surge" - that "prominent Shiite and Sunni politicians [have] called on Iraqi civilians to take up arms to defend themselves." [Robert H. Reid, "Iraqi politicians call on civilians to arm themselves," The Independent, 9 July 2007] So much, then, for the "surge" as a means of stamping down sectarian violence.
In fact, on June 29, 2007, nine days after concluding, "the US is now losing in Iraq," Cordesman noted that "the level of sectarian and ethnic separation now taking place throughout the country, the weakness of the central government at every level, and the rising power of local authority…are now clearly changing the 'surge' strategy." [Cordesman, "Iraq and Anbar: Surge or Separation?" CSIS Publications, June 29, 2007]
Thus, his conclusion: "Even if security in Baghdad is achieved, it cannot be a bridge to successful national conciliation by a weak central government facing massive nation-wide problems in terms of growing local power and civil conflicts." [Ibid]