Marc Baber wrote:
I tend to agree with Paul-- paper ballots are simple to explain
> and have widespread grassroots support.
> Mark and Paul,
> We all agree with you. Almost all of us who began election integrity
> work 2 or 3 or more years ago, actively fought against DRE adoption
> and want DREs to be used as boat anchors or recycled in some
> environmentally friendly fashion.
> However, our foremost goal is to ensure election outcome integrity -
> i.e. make sure that the right people are sworn into office following
> all future elections.
> If we force states to adopt measures like sufficient manual audits to
> ensure accurate election outcomes, states will quickly see how costly,
> time-consuming and untrustworthy DREs are.
> The US Congress cannot mandate that states throw away their shiny new
> toys and the HAVA bill did not outlaw any type of voting system
> because that would be unconstitutional.
> For the purpose of ensuring election outcome accuracy, HR550, as
> written in the last Congress, is insufficient, counterproductive and
> urgently needs to be fixed.
> eg. some HR550 audit flaws included:
> 1. insufficient 2% federal audits would not detect vote miscount that
> could cause wrong election outcomes in a large amount, if not a
> majority, of races
> 2. audits controlled by the US EAC which is probably unconstitutional,
> but also puts audits in the hands of the currently hopelessly
> incompetent unqualified group
> 3. federal audits could interfere with state and county-level audits
> that were sufficient, like the audit that NM may be putting into place
> soon. audits need to be designed at the state level at a minimum, and
> preferably at the county level.
> 4. nothing was written into HR550 that would make the federal audit
> transparent or verifiable to the public, so it could easily result in
> a procedure that could be easily manipulated
> I am half-way between Paul's purists and strategists groups because I
> am wholly against the Holt bill as it was written (better to have no
> legislation at all). Yet by rewriting Holt's audit provision to make
> it verifiable, adequate, and transparent, would soon result in
> hand-countable voter verified paper ballot optical scan voting systems
> As far as adding printers to DREs like those in MD and GA, my
> understanding is (correct me if I'm wrong) that the vendors have
> already said it would not be possible or would be outrageously
> expensive, and so passage of federal legislation requiring VVPATs in
> federal elections would, in MD and GA and perhaps parts of PA, etc.
> cause paperless DREs to be scrapped and optical scan systems to be
> adopted because, as you point out, they are much less expensive.
> An effective way to force out DREs (besides requiring sufficient
> verifiable transparent manual audits) would be to only provide funds
> for optical scan paper ballot systems for meeting the new requirement
> for VVPATs with every system.
> Another way to force out DREs would be to require a technically
> competent US EAC TGDC with backbone, because then the federal
> voluntary standards for security could be improved and the EAC and
> NASED stopped from approving systems that do not meet even the current
> lax standards, all current DRE systems are already technologically
> obsolete because they use no modern security technology (deliberately?).
> There are probably more indirect common-sense measures that you can
> think of which would result in states' scrapping DREs.
> We all agree.
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