As to citizen-run parallel elections, the International Parliamentary Union explains:
Parallel voting tabulation has also proven its value as a means of independently verifying the results reported by electoral authorities. In this process, monitors record results obtained from selected polling sites, and compare them with the official results: The monitoring of vote counts as part of an overall election-observation effort
• Can boost the confidence of voters suspicious of possible fraud;
• Permit results to be projected more quickly than the official results;
• Allow for the identification of actual winners; and
• Allow for the consequent exposure of any attempted manipulations.
REBECCA MERCURI, PhD., Affidavit attached as Exhibit A to Squire v. Geer Complaint, Franklin County (Ohio) Court of Appeals, 06APD-12-1285.
Dr. Rebecca Mercuri has been studying electronic vote tabulation since 1989, and has published over 40 scientific papers on electronic voting technology. She observed the partial recount of Frankin County, Ohio's November 7, 2006 election. She also oversaw the Signature Audit of 25% of Franklin County's records.
Her report found systemic problems, concluding "there cannot be full confidence in the results of these (35) problematic precincts."
She describes Franklin County's recount process as constituting "a breach of procedure that thwarts any meaningfully appropriate and independent recount of the election from the RTALs" (real time audit logs that serve as the ballot of record in Ohio.)
"The recount methodology used by Franklin County did not conform, and in fact significantly varied from the method prescribed by Ohio Secretary of State's Directive No. 2006.50 in many respects."
Dr. Mercuri concludes:
"In summary, there are numerous reasons why there cannot be confidence in the election process, the recount, and the vote totals for the Franklin County, Ohio November 7, 2006 election. These reasons include:
a) the denial of an appropriate recount from the VVPAT/RTAL materials for the requested precincts;
b) significant evidence that parts of original RTALs and end tally reports were missing;
c) evidence the voting system was inappropriately configured and improperly used during the election
d) indication that election procedures were violated, including the possibility of password overrides during setup, and use of the machines to cast ballots after RTAL paper supplies has run out;
e) evidence of inappropriate impounding and handling of election materials at the County warehouse following the election, including improper exposure of the VVPAT/RTALs;
f) unexplained disparities between the public counters of ballots cast and the number of voters who signed the poll books in many precincts; and
g) misleading information provided to voters, and not properly followed up by the County, regarding the safety and examination of the voting machines and system."
OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe): Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2005, Election Observation Manual, http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2005/04/14004_240_en.pdf.
Seventeen Criteria for a Fair Vote Count (p. 62) precludes machine tabulation:
1. Is the count performed by polling-station officials, or are other persons involved?
2. Do election officials appear to understand and adhere to the required procedures?
3. Are ballots counted in an orderly and secure manner?
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