-- detainee [al-Libi] received a letter from UBL's designated courier, Maulawi Abd al-Khaliq Jan" UBL stated detainee would be the official messenger between UBL and others in Pakistan. In mid-2003, detainee moved his family to Abbottabad, PK [Pakistan] and worked between Abbottabad and Peshawar."
Thereafter, Abu al-Libi continued to be "the main contact between UBL and Islamic extremists operating inside Pakistan," and was described as "the communications gatekeeper for UBL and al-Zawahiri."
According to Gareth Porter, citing Mehsud tribal sources in South Waziristan, Pakistan, al-Libi himself had been tasked with finding the best location for bin Laden and his family to reside, and had "suggested Abbottabad."
The document thus reveals that al-Libi had moved to Abbottabad precisely to carry out his appointment as bin Laden's official emissary"--"a major indicator of bin Laden's likely presence in Abbottabad. He was simultaneously to act as a communications gatekeeper for al-Zawahiri"--"a major indicator of al-Zawahiri's likely presence near bin Laden in Abbottabad.
Al-Libi had been passed onto the CIA by Pakistani security forces in late May 2005, during which he provided detailed information on plans by UK-based cells to attack nightclubs and the "subway" network in London, before being moved to Guantanamo the following year.
CIA records show that the torture and interrogation of al-Libi had exhausted the retrieval of information long before his transfer to Guantanamo in September 2006. After more than a month of continually applied 'enhanced interrogation techniques,' the decision was eventually made to cease their use as "CIA officers stated that they had no intelligence to demonstrate that Abu Faraj al-Libi continued to withhold information, and because CIA medical officers expressed concern that additional use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 'may come with unacceptable medical or psychological risks.'"
So the information filed in the 2008 Pentagon report, which collated the basis for recommending al-Libi's prosecution, had in fact been extracted by the CIA prior to his move to Guantanamo in September 2006.
Therefore, as early as 2006, the CIA had compelling evidence that bin Laden had planned to operate from Abbottabad since 2003, and was communicating with militants in Peshawar and elsewhere through al-Libi.
That document disproves claims by Hersh's sources that bin Laden moved to Abbottabad in 2006 as a result of his betrayal by locals who handed him over to the ISI for money"--"rather, the al-Qaeda chief had begun that move three years earlier of his own accord.
Hersh's account asserts that bin Laden had been detained under "house arrest" at the Abbottabad compound since 2006 by the Pakistani ISI as part of a deal with Saudi Arabia, but that the US was not privy to this arrangement.
Yet in the same year, secret US military intelligence documents confirmed not just one, but regular monthly sightings of bin Laden in Pakistan at al-Qaeda planning meetings. A NATO threat report from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan"--"part of the Afghan War logs published by Wikileaks"--"stated:
"Reportedly a high-level meeting was held in Quetta, Pakistan, where six suicide bombers were given orders for an operation in northern Afghanistan. Two persons have been given targets in Kunduz, two in Mazar-e-Sharif and the last two are said to come to Faryab" These meetings take place once every month, and there are usually about 20 people present. The place for the meeting alternates between Quetta and villages (NFDG) on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan" The top four people in these meetings are Mullah Omar [the Taliban leader], Osama bin Laden, Mullah Dadullah and Mullah [Baradar]."
Although the paucity of reports on bin Laden in the Afghan War logs is testament to the terror chief's largely successful efforts at discretion, they show that as early as 2006, having surmised bin Laden's location in or near Abbottabad, US intelligence and its assets on the ground had repeatedly sighted bin Laden.
From 2003 to 2009, as the few other intelligence reports in the logs reveal, bin Laden moved around Pakistan routinely, playing a key role in galvanising and planning terrorist operations. He was certainly not under house arrest.
According to top secret National Security Agency (NSA) documents leaked by whistleblower Edward Snowden, US intelligence had confirmed bin Laden's location in Pakistan in 2007, and been able to track his communication from Pakistan to al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq and Iran:
"SIGINT [signals intelligence] uncovered a message from Usama bin Laden (UBL) intended for al-Qa'ida's #1 man in Iraq" The message was dated 12 February 2007 and was passed via a communications conduit. The movement of the letter from Pakistan to Iran provided the US intelligence community with unique insights into the communications path used by senior al-Qa'ida leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan to communicate with al-Qa'ida leaders in Iraq and Iran."
The intelligence report on the bin Laden communication"--"clearly confirming his residence in Pakistan and homing in on the "communications path used by senior al-Qa'ida leaders""--"was circulated to the Vice President, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, who gave it "rave reviews."
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