“As a result, the CIA missed the radical change that Mikhail Gorbachev represented to Soviet politics and Soviet-American relations, and missed the challenges to his rule and his ultimate demise in 1991,” Goodman wrote.
So, when the Soviet Union – the CIA’s principal target – collapsed without any timely warning to the U.S. government, the CIA didn’t as much “miss” this development as it was blinded by ideological taskmasters to the reality playing out in plain sight.
Covering Up
Then, rather than take the Soviet intelligence failure to heart, Gates and other bureaucrats went to work covering their tracks. For that, they got the help of Harvard’s Kennedy School, which received hundreds of thousands of dollars to finance case studies to show that the CIA “got it right,” Goodman wrote.
“The office director for the Soviet Union during much of the 1980s, when the work of politicization was undertaken, Douglas MacEachin, was sent to Harvard as intelligence officer in residence to help the director of the case studies, Philip Zelikow, prepare these studies,” Goodman wrote.
“In 1993, MacEachin became the CIA’s deputy director for intelligence,” Goodman wrote. “Zelikow and MacEachin were reunited in 2004, when Zelikow was named staff director of the 9/11 commission and appointed MacEachin a team leader on the staff. Zelikow and MacEachin made sure that the commission did not indict the CIA for its contributions to the 9/11 intelligence failure.”
In the 1980s, two other brave analysts – Richard Barlow and Peter Dickson – were punished when they clashed with the Casey-Gates desires regarding analyses on nuclear proliferation issues, particularly evidence that Pakistan was developing a nuclear bomb.
At the time, the Reagan administration wanted the Pakistan-bomb issue downplayed because the Pakistani intelligence service was helping the United States funnel arms to Islamic fundamentalists flocking to Afghanistan to fight Soviet troops.
Ironically, after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, the chief beneficiaries of that covert U.S. program included Osama bin Laden, who used the Afghan war to organize his band of al-Qaeda terrorists, and Pakistani physicists, who did develop a nuclear bomb and sold the technology to “rogue” countries.
Yet, in the 1980s, while out-of-step analysts were pushed aside, many of Gates’s protégés – the likes of John McLaughlin, Paul Pillar and Alan Foley – went on to successful CIA careers. Eventually, they would play key roles in the politicizing of the intelligence on Iraq’s WMD, Goodman wrote.
A central theme of Goodman’s book is that the consequences of this obsequious intelligence – this failure to face reality – have been disastrous:
“Much of the intelligence damage in the run-up to the Iraq War was due to the DI [the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence] believing that it was actually ‘serving’ the White House in preparing its assessments of Iraqi WMD. [Old-time analysts] Langer and Kent did not see themselves as ‘serving’ the White House, but ‘informing’ the White House.”
Gates Advances
Goodman noted that other cozy relationships helped advance Gates’s career and blocked a truthful recounting of recent American history. Goodman even traced the end of serious congressional oversight of intelligence to 1991 and the Senate Intelligence Committee’s capitulation during Gates’s confirmation hearings to be CIA director.
After Gates had been blocked from the top CIA job in 1987 because of his ties to the Iran-Contra scandal, Gates “set about to launder his credentials and particularly to insinuate himself with [Sen. David] Boren,” D-Oklahoma, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Goodman wrote.
“In 1991, the White House checked with Boren to see if Gates could receive confirmation this time around, and Boren angered many Democrats on the intelligence committee when he guaranteed confirmation to White House aide Boyden Gray.”
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