Thieu's Version
President Thieu's fullest account of the peace-talk gambit was recounted by his former aide, Nguyen Tien Hung, in The Palace File (coauthored with Jerrold Schecter). Hung/Schecter reported that "Anna Chennault visited Saigon frequently in 1968 to advise Thieu on Nixon's candidacy and his views on Vietnam. She told him [Thieu] then that Nixon would be a stronger supporter of Vietnam than Humphrey."
Thieu also bypassed his Washington embassy for some of his messages to Chennault, Hung/Schecter wrote. "He relied heavily on his brother Nguyen Van Kieu" and that "Mrs. Chennault often sent messages to Thieu through aides to his brother."
Based on interviews with Chennault, Hung/Schecter reported that she claimed that John Mitchell called her "almost every day" urging her to stop Thieu from going to the Paris peace talks and warning her that she should use pay phones to avoid wiretaps.
Hung/Schecter wrote: "Mitchell's message to her was always the same: 'Don't let him go.'" A few days before the election, Mitchell telephoned her with a message for President Thieu, "Anna, I'm speaking on behalf of Mr. Nixon. It's very important that our Vietnamese friends understand our Republican position and I hope you have made that clear to them.'"
Chennault said, "Thieu was under heavy pressure from the Democrats. My job was to hold him back and prevent him from changing his mind."
As Hung/Schecter wrote: "Throughout October 1968 Thieu tried to delay the Johnson bombing halt decision and an announcement of Paris Talks as long as possible to buy time for Nixon."
For his part, Johnson gradually became aware of the double game being played by Thieu and Nixon. As the days counted down to the election, Johnson was hearing sketchy reports from U.S. intelligence that Thieu was dragging his feet in anticipation of a Nixon victory.
For instance, a "top secret" report on Oct. 23, 1968, report -- presumably based on National Security Agency's electronic eavesdropping -- quotes Thieu as saying that the Johnson administration might halt U.S. bombing of North Vietnam as part of a peace gesture that would help Humphrey's campaign, but that South Vietnam might not go along.
"The situation which would occur as the result of a bombing halt, without the agreement of the [South] Vietnamese government ... would be to the advantage of candidate Nixon," the NSA report on Thieu's thinking read. "Accordingly, he [Thieu] said that the possibility of President Johnson enforcing a bombing halt without [South] Vietnam's agreement appears to be weak." [For the document, click here and here.]
By Oct. 28, 1968, according to another NSA report, Thieu said "it appears that Mr. Nixon will be elected as the next president" and that any settlement with the Viet Cong should be put off until "the new president" was in place.
Wall Street Intrigue
The next day, Oct. 29, national security adviser Walt Rostow received the first clear indication that Nixon might actually be coordinating with Thieu to sabotage the peace talks. Rostow's brother, Eugene, who was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, wrote a memo about a tip from a source in New York who had spoken with "a member of the banking community" who was "very close to Nixon."
The source said Wall Street bankers -- at a working lunch to assess likely market trends and to decide where to invest -- had been given inside information about the prospects for Vietnam peace and were told that Nixon was obstructing that outcome.
"The conversation was in the context of a professional discussion about the future of the financial markets in the near term," Eugene Rostow wrote...
"The speaker said he thought the prospects for a bombing halt or a cease-fire were dim, because Nixon was playing the problem ... to block. ...
"They would incite Saigon to be difficult, and Hanoi to wait. Part of his strategy was an expectation that an offensive would break out soon, that we would have to spend a great deal more (and incur more casualties) -- a fact which would adversely affect the stock market and the bond market. NVN [North Vietnamese] offensive action was a definite element in their thinking about the future."
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