Foucault says, "This necessity of penitential practice - that it be carried out only through manifestations designed to bring the penitent's truth to light - raises a problem: when one has sinned, why must one not only repent - imposing rigors and macerations upon himself [or herself] - but also show these acts and show oneself as one is? Why does the manifestation of the truth constitute an intrinsic part of the procedure that enables one to redeem the sin? When one has 'done wrong,' why is it necessary to make the truth shine forth, not only the truth about what one did, but about what one is? The answer is obvious: once the Christian religion was formed into a Church endowed with a strong communitarian structure and a hierarchical organization, no serious infraction [i.e., sin] could be pardoned without a certain number of proofs and guarantees. Just as a candidate for baptism couldn't be accepted without having been tested beforehand through the catechumenate - probation animae - the Church couldn't reconcile those who hadn't clearly manifested their repentance through discipline and exercises that stood for punishment in relation to the past and showed commitment to the future. They [the sinners] had to practice publication sui" - public avowal of themselves and their sin(s) (pages 73-74).
However, in the context of Christian monasticism, the practice of the examination of conscience and confession changed. Foucault says, "It's here [in the context of the interior examination of conscience] that the necessity of confession is established. This confession shouldn't be imagined as the result of an examination first conducted in the form of strict interiority, and then offered in the form of confidential disclosure. The confession in this instance must be as close as possible to the examination - as the examination's exterior aspect, its verbal face turned toward the other [person, the confessor receiving the confession]. One's self-observation and verbalization of such should be one and the same. Seeing and saying in a single act - such is the ideal to which the novice [monk in the monastery] must aspire" (page 105).
Even though Foucault often refers to technologies of the self, he does occasionally describe certain practices as a game. For example, he says, "Telling-the-truth-about-oneself is essential in this game of purification and salvation" (page 53).
In addition, Foucault says, "The indispensable discretion [the virtue of discretion in one's decision-making] - which enable one to trace the right path to perfection between the two dangers of the too-much and the too-little, this discretion, which is not a natural endowment of [humankind], haunted as [humans are] by the Enemy's [Satan's] power of seduction - can be practiced only with the grace of God by means of this process of examination-confession: this game in which one's focus on oneself must always be combined with 'truth-telling' regarding oneself" (page 108).
Foucault's use of game in the two quoted passages calls to mind John Huizinga's book Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture, translated from the 1944 German edition, but without identifying the translator (London: Routledge, 1949).
(Article changed on Jun 03, 2021 at 7:38 AM EDT)
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