For decades the two antagonistic camps in the region, broadly
speaking, were the US, Israel and pro-Western corrupt dictatorships and
monarchies on the one hand, and on the other pro-resistance groups (including
Islamist, nationalist, and leftist movements) supported by the Arab masses in
alliance with Iran and Syria. When the Arab Spring erupted in Tunisia, Egypt,
and Yemen, the first camp was nervous while the second camp was cheering. When
it reached Libya, the first camp was applauding while the second camp was split,
but only due to the erratic nature of Qaddafi.
However, when the revolutionary spirit finally reached Syria,
the first camp saw a rare but real opportunity to break Syria's alliance with
Iran and weaken, if not destroy, the resistance axis extending from Lebanon to
Iran. This is primarily why the Syrian situation is distinguished from the
others.
As in all political transformations, when popular revolts
break out, countries and political movements formulate their strategic and
tactical calculations as they pursue policies that advance their interests. But
the Arab masses in the streets have no such designs, as they usually side with
the protesters yearning for freedom and dignity. However, the Syrian opposition
groups, which started to organize themselves against the Assad regime in order
to offer a viable alternative, have also made their own short-term calculations
as to which camp they would join.
Despite the fact that no political group could claim the
Syrian uprising, Syrian opposition groups and prominent individuals including
intellectuals, academics, dissidents, and former politicians formed an exile
opposition group, based in Turkey, called the Syrian National Council (SNC),
similar to Libya's Transitional National Council. The Muslim Brotherhood in
Syria, with its strong organizational skills and presence abroad, has been
instrumental in bringing this together and is able to exercise a great influence
within the SNC, if not actually dominate it.
A secular academic based in Paris, Burhan Ghalioun, was chosen
to head the SNC along with other secular, liberal, and Islamist individuals,
selected mainly from abroad. From its inception last October, it was clear that
the SNC chose the path of absolute regime change through the
internationalization of the conflict regardless of the consequences. Its
spokespersons have called for a Libyan-style intervention from the UN, NATO, or
other powers. In their attempt to woo the US and the West, they downplayed the
conflict with Israel, and promised to distance themselves from Iran and Hezbollah. While vocally attacking Iran and its allies and praising the
pro-Western Arab monarchies, they have invariably used sectarian and hostile
language.
Throughout the summer and fall, the SNC solidified its
position within the Arab world, especially with the GCC countries, as well as
with the West. Those who are wary of undue Western influence and its unwavering
support for Israeli aggression and expansionism became nervous with regard to
the increasingly alarming statements coming from SNC leadership and
spokespersons. In many instances SNC leadership offered assurances as to their
support of the break-up of the resistance axis, while embracing the language of
the pro-Western Arab regimes of hollow compromises. Although several countries,
led by Libya and Tunisia, have officially recognized the SNC as the official
representative of the Syrian people, over a dozen others led by the US, the
European Union, and Turkey have either promised to officially recognize the
group in the near future or opened a dialogue with it.
Recently, several prominent members led by secular judge and
human rights activist, Haitham Al-Maleh, 81, a veteran of Assad's prisons, split
from the SNC and formed a new faction called the Syrian Patriotic Group. They
claim that the SNC has been ineffective, weak, and irresolute. Another vocal opposition leader is also Paris-based human rights activist
Haitham Manna'a, of the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change.
His organization also advocates the overthrow of the Assad regime, but within the
Arab context and short of foreign intervention.
Meanwhile, inside the country the organized opposition
coalesced around the Local Coordination Committees (LCC). For months, the LCC
unequivocally rejected foreign intervention and was willing to engage in a
dialogue with the regime. However, it was clear that the regime believed only in
imposing its will on the people through subjugation and fear tactics, using its
bloody military onslaught, security crackdowns and thugs. Over time, the LCC
weakened and its supporters became desperate, calling for safe passages and
protection measures.
Based in Turkey, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) is led by former
Air Force Col. Riad Al-As'aad. The FSA is comprised of several hundred army
defectors who refused to join the onslaught against their own citizens and have
taken arms against the regime. They claim to have caused more than 1,200 casualties on
the Syrian army in the past three months and is overtly asking for the armed
overthrow of the Assad regime. Every week several dozen defectors join the group,
but mainly from the lower ranks.
Despite its historically friendly relations with the Assad
regime, Turkey has been vocal in backing the demands of the uprising and has
become the main sponsor of the groups challenging the legitimacy of the
government. In short, a regional realignment has taken place with Iran and
Turkey strongly opposing each other across the Syrian theater.
As the bloody crisis dominated the news cycles in the Arab
world, the Arab street became confused. While it wholeheartedly embraced the
Syrian uprising and despised the cruelty of the Assad regime, it was distrustful
of those who claim to speak on its behalf. The division within the Syrian
opposition as to how to deal with the crisis has played into the hands of the
regime as it became more confident and belligerent in its handling of the
crisis.
Since February 4, the day the UN Security Council failed to
pass a resolution to stop the bloodshed, the regime stepped up its brutality and
has continued its siege and daily shelling of the city of Homs, killing hundreds
of civilians, including dozens of women and children. As part of its political
reforms, the regime passed a new constitution in late February, amidst the siege
and shelling of many cities and neighborhoods. With the total breakdown of trust
between the regime and its opponents, the new constitution, which offered
inconsequential and cosmetic changes, was immediately rejected by the
opposition. In essence, it secured the presidency for Assad until 2028 while
excluding all major opposition candidates by demanding that any candidate must have
resided in Syria for the last 10 years, ignoring the fact that all major
opposition leaders have been in exile for years if not decades.
As in the old constitution, the presidential powers are
sweeping like any monarch, but in name. Not only is the president the head of the
executive branch, the commander-in-chief, security agencies, and the police, but
also the head of the judiciary and justice systems. He appoints all judges,
senior government officials including the prime minister, ministers, their
deputies, ambassadors, and other senior officials without parliament
confirmation. He can dissolve the parliament at any time and legislate when the
parliament is not in session, which could be as much as six months a year.
Further, the constitution reserves for the president the authority to declare a
state of emergency and thus rule by decree. Clearly all such powers invested by
this constitution in the position of president are contrary to the concept of
democratic governance based on checks and balances and separation of powers.
So what are the possible scenarios for the Syrian
quagmire?
The Tunisia/Egyptian scenario: In this scenario, the
army would force the president to either resign or go into exile. But in the
Syrian context this is extremely unlikely since the composition of the Syrian
army is completely different from those in Egypt or Tunisia. The army's most
senior officers are led by either close relatives of Assad, such as his brother
or brother-in-law, or from officers belonging to the Alawite sect. In other
words, they know that if the president goes, they must go as well.
The Yemeni scenario: In January, the Arab League
adopted this model, which was based on the GCC initiative to end the rule of Ali
Abdullah Saleh in Yemen and contain the popular revolution. In that plan,
President Saleh and his family were given immunity in exchange for the transfer
of power to his vice president who would share power with a prime minister from
the opposition. Within two years, a new constitution is supposed to be written
and new elections held. But unlike the Syrian regime, Saleh was not backed by
international or regional powers to stay in power. His patron for many years,
the US, was in fact encouraging him behind the scenes to leave so as to maintain
its influence in the government before revolutionary elements take over. The US also
wanted to continue its military presence and freedom of movement against
Al-Qaeda in the region. In January, the Arab League adopted the same plan for
Syria but it was not only flatly rejected by the Syrian regime, but also by the
opposition groups, which loathe the Ba'ath party political machinery.
Nevertheless, the initiative was presented to the UN Security Council and faced
the double veto of the Russia and China.
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