Over the last ten years the Israeli “concessions” have been reversed. Today, Israel is still the only country allowed to spend its foreign military aid – now all of it – wherever it wants. As for the reduction from $3 billion to $2.4 billion in annual direct military aid, that will return to $3 billion under a new Bush proposal. Unknown is whether Egypt’s military will also go back to receiving $1.8 billion – its “2” in the Camp David-associated 3-to-2 ratio.
Another unanswered question about the proposed arms deal is: Why now?
Had the administration moved before November 2003, the announcement would have been seen in the region as an audacious – given the “success” of U.S.-led coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq – but credible recommitment by Washington to the then 25 year-old policy of diplomatic, economic, and military (conventional and nuclear) containment of Tehran’s ambitions in the Gulf.
But looking at the Saudi record and Riyadh’s increasing propensity to act in its interests without coordinating with Washington, there is the suggestion that the Bush administration is suddenly wary of its “other” flank in the Persian Gulf – the one occupied by the Saudi-dominated six-member Gulf Cooperation Council.
Militarily overcommitted in mid-summer 2007, the White House has only two cards to play: pump up fear of Iran acquiring enough enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon, or bribe the regional allies. For a few months the nuclear fear factor seemed to work, but Tehran seems to have become “reasonable” enough in its position to defuse tensions with most of the main actors in this dispute.
This left the Bush administration with bribery, spiced with a touch of traditional Sunni-Shi’a sectarianism that underpins relations between Riyadh and Tehran even when they cooperate (e.g., the just-formed Iraq security sub-committee).So this week the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense are on an old-fashion, bribe-them-first-then-twist-arms, whistle-stop campaign to make sure regional “allies” – this time including the Saudis – are in line behind U.S. policy.
But the multi-billion dollar arms deal has some inconsistencies that could cause the two secretaries problems. The most immediate one is the policy message represented by the sheer size of the arms deal. Washington has been insisting that there is no military solution to the region’s trauma. Yet it is proposing $63 billion for weapons that will, if used, only increase trauma.And that total apparently doesn’t include $40 million in guns, bullets, rockets, missiles, small arms ammunition, night vision goggles, and spare parts for the Lebanese army this year and another $280 million for 2008. Nor does it include the $3 billion Iraq is spending on weapons and ammunition.
The sale, once Congress is formally notified, will go through unless Congress acts to block it. The Israelis say this time they have no objection – Prime Minister Olmert and the Israel Defense Forces see Tehran as a greater threat than Riyadh. As for the Pentagon, it hopes that the increased production of some items will save it money through economy of scale. And of course U.S. companies that build weapons and munitions are pleased at the prospect of new contracts and new profits.
But what this proposal doesn’t explain – unless it’s somewhere in the fine print that hasn’t yet come to light – is how pouring more weapons into the Middle East moves the region in general and Iraq in particular any closer to resolving the underlying political impasse. George Bush started the Iraq war over weapons that never existed. It’s ironic that his administration seems to now think the way to end the war is to make sure there are more weapons. Go figure!
(Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher).
