2. Publish an analysis of acquisition, transition, and continuing costs of all systems under consideration; and
3. Demonstrate in public, for all systems under consideration, that all work necessary for the conduct of elections can be performed by bi-partisan elections staff and will not require the delegation of any tasks to vendor technicians for any reason, including the employment of secret software or systems that cannot be serviced by bi-partisan staff; and
4. Certify that the voter verified paper audit record produced by Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) systems under consideration use paper of a quality that does not fade during the time that such records are required to be kept, and do not require climate-controlled storage; and
5. Demonstrate in public the ease of use and accuracy for all systems under consideration, via the conduct of a multi-machine Mock Election Public Test with a minimum of four machines and a central tabulator if it is part of the new voting system, in which the rate of error or malfunctions does not exceed that which has been recorded for our present lever voting machines; and
6. Demonstrate to the public the effectiveness of vendor documentation, training materials, and ability to train county staff by requiring the vendor to train Board of Elections staff, and Board of Elections staff to independently perform all tasks to prepare the test machines for the test including ballot programming, and to train election inspectors for the test, and to perform all post-election tasks to canvass the votes; and
7. Demonstrate to the public the accuracy of the votes displayed on the DRE screen and voter verified printout, tallies, and DRE activity logs; and
8. Demonstrate to the public the accuracy of associated tabulating equipment results; and
9. Conduct a Professional Hacking Test ("Red Test"), such as the RABA Technologies test commissioned by the Department of Legislative Services of the Maryland General Assembly; and
10. Conduct a Public Hacking Test, such as the one sponsored by Leon County, Florida Supervisor of Elections Ion Sancho and Harri Hursti, the computer security expert from Finland; and
11. Demonstrate to the public the capacity of bipartisan staff of the New York City Board of Elections to conduct a procedure to confirm that any voting systems equipment purchased and delivered for use in city elections is correctly configured and consists of exactly the same components as the system of that type that was certified for use in New York State by the State Board of Elections, including a demonstration of an easily-used inventory list of all system components in each state-certified voting system under consideration, which includes all hardware, programming, files, file system structures, documentation, training materials, accessories, and all other components, and a demonstration that all components are safe and proper for inclusion in a voting system in New York State, and that no components would allow for illegal activities such as wireless communications; and
12. Commit to audits, both before and after each election, that will verify that the machines used are correctly configured and contained exactly the same components as the system of that type that was certified for use in New York State; and
13. Commit that all political parties with candidates in an election may designate technical and legal representatives to inspect voting systems before elections for illegal communication capability whether hardware, software, firmware, or any other type; and
14. Commit that the testing of electronic voting systems that include the use of test ballots will use ballots entered via the same method by voters on election day, including use of all accessibility attachments, minority language displays, DRE voter verified printouts, and extraction of end-of-day results; and
15. Commit to include in the contract for procurement the posting of a bond or letter of credit so that vendors can remedy the problems that occur, and reimburse the additional expenses that are incurred, due to the determination that systems upon delivery, or after vendor access to systems, are corrupt or different from the state-certified version of the system; and
16. Commit that if a recognized computer professional or security expert believes that they have found a weakness in the voting system acquired, the Board of Elections shall arrange for a test to enable such professional or expert to demonstrate the presence of the weakness and suggest ways to remedy it; and
Whereas, These measures will further enhance the democratic process and ultimately improve voter participation once the new systems are in place; now, therefore, be it
3. Demonstrate in public, for all systems under consideration, that all work necessary for the conduct of elections can be performed by bi-partisan elections staff and will not require the delegation of any tasks to vendor technicians for any reason, including the employment of secret software or systems that cannot be serviced by bi-partisan staff; and
4. Certify that the voter verified paper audit record produced by Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) systems under consideration use paper of a quality that does not fade during the time that such records are required to be kept, and do not require climate-controlled storage; and
5. Demonstrate in public the ease of use and accuracy for all systems under consideration, via the conduct of a multi-machine Mock Election Public Test with a minimum of four machines and a central tabulator if it is part of the new voting system, in which the rate of error or malfunctions does not exceed that which has been recorded for our present lever voting machines; and
7. Demonstrate to the public the accuracy of the votes displayed on the DRE screen and voter verified printout, tallies, and DRE activity logs; and
8. Demonstrate to the public the accuracy of associated tabulating equipment results; and
9. Conduct a Professional Hacking Test ("Red Test"), such as the RABA Technologies test commissioned by the Department of Legislative Services of the Maryland General Assembly; and
10. Conduct a Public Hacking Test, such as the one sponsored by Leon County, Florida Supervisor of Elections Ion Sancho and Harri Hursti, the computer security expert from Finland; and
11. Demonstrate to the public the capacity of bipartisan staff of the New York City Board of Elections to conduct a procedure to confirm that any voting systems equipment purchased and delivered for use in city elections is correctly configured and consists of exactly the same components as the system of that type that was certified for use in New York State by the State Board of Elections, including a demonstration of an easily-used inventory list of all system components in each state-certified voting system under consideration, which includes all hardware, programming, files, file system structures, documentation, training materials, accessories, and all other components, and a demonstration that all components are safe and proper for inclusion in a voting system in New York State, and that no components would allow for illegal activities such as wireless communications; and
12. Commit to audits, both before and after each election, that will verify that the machines used are correctly configured and contained exactly the same components as the system of that type that was certified for use in New York State; and
13. Commit that all political parties with candidates in an election may designate technical and legal representatives to inspect voting systems before elections for illegal communication capability whether hardware, software, firmware, or any other type; and
14. Commit that the testing of electronic voting systems that include the use of test ballots will use ballots entered via the same method by voters on election day, including use of all accessibility attachments, minority language displays, DRE voter verified printouts, and extraction of end-of-day results; and
15. Commit to include in the contract for procurement the posting of a bond or letter of credit so that vendors can remedy the problems that occur, and reimburse the additional expenses that are incurred, due to the determination that systems upon delivery, or after vendor access to systems, are corrupt or different from the state-certified version of the system; and
16. Commit that if a recognized computer professional or security expert believes that they have found a weakness in the voting system acquired, the Board of Elections shall arrange for a test to enable such professional or expert to demonstrate the presence of the weakness and suggest ways to remedy it; and
Whereas, These measures will further enhance the democratic process and ultimately improve voter participation once the new systems are in place; now, therefore, be it
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