"These top advisers signed off on how the CIA would interrogate top al-Qaeda suspects – whether they would be slapped, pushed, deprived of sleep or subjected to simulated drowning, called waterboarding, sources told ABC News."
Resistance on Torture
Yoo wrote that the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) often clashed with the State Department over international laws banning torture.
"In our arguments, State would authoritatively pronounce what the international law was," Yoo wrote. "OLC usually responded 'Why?'-as in why do you believe that, why should we follow Europe's view of international law, why should we not fall back on our traditions and historical state practices?"
Yoo wrote that the policies he and other senior administration officials recommended, that al-Qaeda and the Taliban were not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Convention, also rankled military lawyers.
"Judge Advocates General [JAG's] worried that if the United States did not follow the Geneva Conventions, our enemies might take it as justification to abuse American POW's in the future," Yoo wrote. "From what I saw the military had a fair opportunity to make it's views known. Representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including uniformed lawyers, were present at important meetings on the Geneva question and fully aired their arguments."
The consensus among the officials who participated in the December 2001 meetings formed the basis of a legal memo sent to Gonzales that advised the White House that al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners were not entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status or the Geneva Convention.
Bush accepted that legal opinion verbally on Jan. 18, 2002.
"The only way to prevent future September 11s will be by acquiring intelligence," Yoo wrote. "The main way of doing that is by interrogating captured al-Qaeda leaders or breaking into their communications.... In an opinion eventually issued on Jan. 22, 2002, OLC concluded that al-Qaeda could not claim the benefits of the Geneva Conventions."
Yoo also wrote that in January 2002 he and the other administration officials who participated in the December 2001 meetings took a trip to Guantanamo Bay to observe the interrogations of several detainees
The trip took place seven months before he drafted the first of two legal opinions that were later withdrawn.
"A gust of warm, humid air embraced us as we disembarked at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay," Yoo wrote in his book. "I was the junior person on the flight among the senior lawyers there from the White House, Departments of Defense, State and Justice.
"The group of us who landed that day had no idea that the 'front' in the war on terrorism would soon move from the battlefields of Afghanistan to the cells of Gitmo."
Geneva Protections
In the context of explaining why the prisoners were not entitled to the benefits of the Geneva Convention or prisoner of war status, Yoo wrote:
"When our group of lawyers visited Gitmo, the Marine general in charge told us that several of the detainees had arrived screaming that they wanted to kill guards and other Americans. ...
Resistance on Torture
Yoo wrote that the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) often clashed with the State Department over international laws banning torture.
"In our arguments, State would authoritatively pronounce what the international law was," Yoo wrote. "OLC usually responded 'Why?'-as in why do you believe that, why should we follow Europe's view of international law, why should we not fall back on our traditions and historical state practices?"
"Judge Advocates General [JAG's] worried that if the United States did not follow the Geneva Conventions, our enemies might take it as justification to abuse American POW's in the future," Yoo wrote. "From what I saw the military had a fair opportunity to make it's views known. Representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including uniformed lawyers, were present at important meetings on the Geneva question and fully aired their arguments."
The consensus among the officials who participated in the December 2001 meetings formed the basis of a legal memo sent to Gonzales that advised the White House that al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners were not entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status or the Geneva Convention.
Bush accepted that legal opinion verbally on Jan. 18, 2002.
"The only way to prevent future September 11s will be by acquiring intelligence," Yoo wrote. "The main way of doing that is by interrogating captured al-Qaeda leaders or breaking into their communications.... In an opinion eventually issued on Jan. 22, 2002, OLC concluded that al-Qaeda could not claim the benefits of the Geneva Conventions."
Yoo also wrote that in January 2002 he and the other administration officials who participated in the December 2001 meetings took a trip to Guantanamo Bay to observe the interrogations of several detainees
The trip took place seven months before he drafted the first of two legal opinions that were later withdrawn.
"A gust of warm, humid air embraced us as we disembarked at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay," Yoo wrote in his book. "I was the junior person on the flight among the senior lawyers there from the White House, Departments of Defense, State and Justice.
"The group of us who landed that day had no idea that the 'front' in the war on terrorism would soon move from the battlefields of Afghanistan to the cells of Gitmo."
Geneva Protections
In the context of explaining why the prisoners were not entitled to the benefits of the Geneva Convention or prisoner of war status, Yoo wrote:
"When our group of lawyers visited Gitmo, the Marine general in charge told us that several of the detainees had arrived screaming that they wanted to kill guards and other Americans. ...
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