Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) lawyers revealed at a conference in May that contractors make up 51 percent of the staff in DIA offices. At the CIA, the situation is similar. Between 50 and 60 percent of the workforce of the CIA's most important directorate, the National Clandestine Service (NCS), responsible for the gathering of human intelligence, is composed of employees of for-profit corporations."
While the numbers themselves are shocking, remember, these are 2007 numbers. At the same time, Agencies according to the law are supposed to physically keep oversight over the companies and contractors. All Intelligence was supposed to be filtered and a neutral report written by the agency before it was put into the POTUS daily briefing. This briefing is singly the most important document produced because of its potential impact on the world. From it, the president of the USA decides:
- Who is the enemy?
- Who is friendly (there really aren't any friends out there)?
- Who is a danger and how?
- Why are they a danger?
- What is their motivation?
- What steps will the US need to take to stop them, turn them in a different direction, or make peace with them?
Dr. Hillhouse describes what being in the Intel community during the Cold War was like being a part of an extended family. Everyone was doing the work because of a commitment to public service. People counted on each other and looked after each other.
By 2007 this was no longer the case. The critical departments of the agencies themselves were EXTRA-LEGALLY almost fully privatized. It's not a stretch to say that for some of the most secret and sensitive work in Intel was staffed by what amounts to day hires.
She describes the change in the Intel community as cataclysmic because it went from that strong tight-knit family setting to resembling groups of problem kids in foster homes because everybody was temporary and there was no commitment to them, job security, or real bonafide oversight.
In an earlier article detailing the rise and dangers of private contractors accessing Vault 7 tools, it becomes clear that to be a star in the new Intel community, the only qualification is knowing how to network. And it helps if you hate the right people. One of the biggest stars of Intel over the last decade is a former gift shop cashier that had no Intelligence experience or training.
In that article, I asked Professor Michael Jasinsky Assistant Professor Department of Political Science University of Wisconsin--Oshkosh about this. Professor Jasinski had oversight over researchers that were later hired by US Intel agencies and provided evaluations of them prior to their employment.
His comments show why a radical cleanup in both Intel and counter-terrorism needs to happen. With the following statement he also added that their obvious patriotic feelings were real, but: "Considering how the intelligence community is depicted in the media or in the movies (and clearly CIA "outreach" plays a role here), you'd think Jedi Knights. The Justice League. Gandalf. But if you ever had personal contact with the "three-letter agencies" for any period of time, you'd think different. My most recent experience with the "intelligence" community was at MIIS, post-9/11 when the agencies were coming there to hire, and they were hiring big. They hired many of my research assistants--I was doing what might be termed "open-source intelligence" on WMD proliferation--and in the process, they'd ask me, their immediate supervisor, for my opinion. So I'd tell them point-blank: can't read, can't write, can't analyze. I don't care what their CV says, the only language they can function in at any level is English. No matter, they'd get hired anyway. Drug convictions? No matter, they'd get hired anyway (at least at the time, the CIA would hire you if you didn't have any drug convictions within the last 3 years). Scary political views they wore on their sleeve? No matter, they'd get hired anyway. All of my good assistants went to work for the UN, IAEA, major NGOs. The dregs went to "intelligence." So now when I see a) the "Russian interference" stories and b) the inability to safeguard, and presumably use responsibly, your own cyber-warfare arsenal, I can't say I'm exactly surprised. But there are no shortcuts in this kind of work. If you rapidly expand at the cost of dramatically lowering standards, you (and the country) are going to pay a price. We're paying it right now.."
Because their job depends on contracts being won or lost, there was no longer a commitment to public service. People take real Intel from one company to another, to another, and so on. Hillhouse noted that out of work spies do what spies do best...they spy and sell secrets.
"More than 70 percent of the Pentagon's Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) unit is staffed by contractors, known as ' green badgers ' , who also represent the majority of personnel in the DIA, the CIA's National Clandestine Service, and the National Counterterrorism Center. At the CIA's station in Islamabad contractors reportedly outnumber government employees three to one." -' We Can't Spy " If We Can't Buy! ' : The Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing ' Inherently Governmental Functions ' Simon Chesterman- The European Journal of International Law Vol. 19 no. 5 - EJIL 2008;
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