This article castigates the US plan of advancing technology in warfare as the article continues As noted earlier, fourth generation warfare involves non-state actors, organized in decentralized networks, instead of the traditional hierarchical networks of nation states. Human intelligence is the only intelligence discipline capable of penetrating these networks to learn the true plans and intentions of an adversary. This is evident in recent failures of technical intelligence capabilities. Many believe that had the United States maintained a vigorous human intelligence capability, the events of September 11, 2001 could have been averted. In addition, the failure to win the war in both Iraq and Afghanistan has also been blamed on inadequate human intelligence collection capabilities.
When we kill a Muslim in Iraq we generate terrorists not only there but in other Muslim countries also in any impoverished country who hates the US for hoarding too much of our world's resources. What specifically have been our failures in Afghanistan?
At the start of our war in Afghanistan this article told us we were
doomed to failure which serves to amplify the point that we haven't
adapted to Fourth Generation Warfare. The 5 May 2002 article Military
Response to Fourth Generation Warfare in Afghanistan states:
 At this writing, the American military response to 11 September has been confined to the war . It may be too early to look at lessons learned, but it is not too early for an assessment of whether or not we have been successful fighting Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) as operations unfold in Afghanistan against the Taliban or Al Qaeda. Further, it is not too early to adjust our tactics, techniques, and even the American Way of War to combat an illusive, determined, and deadly enemy that operates outside the framework of the nation-state.
While our foes are adapting their ways of war, operating outside the nation-state paradigm, we largely operate as a second generation military trying to fight fourth generation adversaries. We have yet to transition the American military from second generation warfare to third generation warfare even though both the Army and the Marine Corps dallied with maneuver warfare concepts in the 1980s before relapsing into the more comfortable attrition-style warfare. The immediate challenge we face is reviving our third generation maneuver warfare efforts to accommodate the challenges in combating 4GW.
It is refreshing to remember that not too long ago we were in a quagmire only in Afghanistan. Both the Army and Marine have unsuccessfully attempted to change from second generation military tactics.
The article enumerates some similarities between the Vietnam and
Afghanistan quagmires and states:
 One of the significant differences is that so far, the US has resisted the temptation of committing large numbers of ground forces to the fight. At present there are about 6,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan compared to a high of 550,000 in Vietnam. According to the Washington Times, General Tommy Franks is keeping the U.S. force levels low to avoid presenting lucrative targets to the Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. Significantly, if necessary, the U.S. can easily extract 6,000 troops far easier than 600,000. A smaller operational footprint enhances strategic options.
This article also applauds our strategy of having few troops on the grounds because the more that are in danger the more that will be injured or killed. The same concern was raised during the Surge of troops in Iraq.
The article details that we let bin laden escape and said that was
due to:
 The real failure was in misreading the cultural intelligence that should have told us that our somewhat erratic allies were not up to this fight. Motivation of the friendlies should have been a top priority. One suspects that our Special Operations Forces advisors knew as much and probably reported it through the chain of command. Eventually, the Afghani warlords were turned around, but by then it was too late.
What does this article written at the beginning of our war in Afghanistan predict? It states Our military forces so far have mixed results in trying to cope with 4GW. We have the potential of dealing with 4GW by learning from the Special Operations Forces and their experiences and applying them in new ways based on people and ideas, not addiction to technological hardware. We will fail if we insist in using traditional 2GW military responses with conventional forces where they are inappropriate.
Can we fight 4GW and win? The jury is still out. We have had some
success on the ground in Afghanistan, but the recent employment of
conventional forces in Operation Anaconda is regression to a failing
concept. No matter how many Predator Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) armed
with Hellfire missiles, no matter how many satellite photos, and no
matter how many signals intercepts, this war, like all others, will be
won or lost by ideas.
How does this concentration on fourth generation warfare in Afghanistan
correspond to what Obama is being presented?
The article Too
Big to Fail? Why All the President's Afghan Options Are Bad Ones
states:
Meanwhile, the U.S. command in Afghanistan is considering a strategy that involves pulling back from the countryside and focusing on protecting more heavily populated areas (which might be called, with the first U.S. Afghan War of the 1980s in mind, the Soviet strategy . The underpopulated parts of the countryside would then undoubtedly be left to Hellfire missile-armed American drone aircraft. In the last week, three U.S. helicopters -- the only practical way to get around a mountainous country with a crude, heavily mined system of roads -- went down under questionable circumstances (another potential sign of an impending Soviet-style disaster.
Who is our ally in Afghanistan? Well, the enemy says he is our hand-picked man-- President Hamid Karzai--"the mayor of Kabul" because the second election has his opponent Abdullah Abdullah withdrawing in protest. The article continues -- the winner will, once again, be the Taliban. (And let's not forget the recent New York Times revelation that the President's alleged drug-kingpin brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, whom American officials regularly and piously denounce, is, in fact, a long-term paid agent of the CIA and its literal landlord in the southern city of Kandahar. If you were a Taliban propagandist, you couldn't make this stuff up.
The GOP loves playing the fear card. Tricky Dick utilized fear in his absurd domino theory to keep us in Vietnam. Now those who are advocating that we stay in Afghanistan are utilizing similar tactics.
The article states:
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