Another concern was the "uranium metal document" cited (as noted above) in the more recent report as the only information the IAEA has "on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon." The February report noted that, according to Iran, the document was received from Pakistan along with centrifuge documentation "and that it had not been requested by Iran. The Agency is still waiting for a response from Pakistan on the circumstances of the delivery of this document."
Since then, as the May report notes, "Pakistan has confirmed…that an identical document exists in Pakistan," corroborating Iran's explanation for its possession of the document.
With regard to Iran's research on Polonium-210, the February report stated that "Based on an examination of all information provided by Iran, the Agency concluded that the explanations concerning the content and magnitude of the polonium-210 experiments were consistent with the Agency's findings and with other information available to it. The Agency considers this question no longer outstanding at this stage."
With regard to Iran's Gchine uranium mine, "The Agency concluded that the information and explanations provided by Iran were supported by the documentation, the content of which is consistent with the information already available to the Agency. The Agency considers this question no longer outstanding at this stage."
The fifth outstanding issue was with regard to the "alleged studies" shown in the 18 documents "which the Agency had been given by other Member States, purportedly originating from Iran." Iran "stated that the allegations were baseless and that the information which the Agency had shown to Iran was fabricated." The report notes that some of the documents were not made available to Iran.[11]
Nor have they been since that time. According to The Washington Post, "Some U.S. agencies have refused to allow the IAEA to show the original documents to Iran."[12]
Thus, out of the five remaining outstanding issues at the time of the February report, three were deemed then to be no longer outstanding. A fourth, regarding the "uranium metal document" was awaiting further corroboration from Pakistan of Iran's explanation for its possession of the document, which the IAEA has since received. The last remaining outstanding issue is with regard to the "alleged studies" purportedly shown in documents provided by other nations that Iran claims are forgeries. While these documents are indeed a "serious concern" when considering allegations of Iran's "cat-and-mouse" game with the IAEA, it must also be considered that Iran hasn't even been presented with some of these documents cited as evidence of its intention to build a bomb. The follow-up May report doesn't reiterate issues deemed no longer outstanding from the February report, giving cause for that context to be conveniently forgotten in US media reports.
The fact is that the IAEA has noted substantial progress in resolving outstanding issues that remain in the process of verifying the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Iran's right to research and develop nuclear technology for energy is guaranteed under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Iran has allowed the IAEA access and oversight under the terms of its Safeguards Agreement, and the Agency has continued to successfully monitor Iran's program, detecting no proscribed activities indicating a parallel weapons program.
As the IAEA Secretary General Mohammed El Baradei noted at the World Economic Forum the week before the delivery of the May report to the UN, "We haven't seen indications or any concrete evidence that Iran is building a nuclear weapon and I've been saying that consistently for the last five years."[13]
One must be forgiven if one had arrived at a different conclusion based on contrary impressions delivered to the public by the US media.
[1] Elaine Sciolino, "Atomic Monitor Signals Concerns Over Iran's Work," The New York Times, May 27, 2008
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/27/world/middleeast/27iran.html
[2] "Iran and the Inspectors," The New York Times, May 28, 2008
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/28/opinion/28wed2.html?pagewanted=print
[3] "Iran's Failed ‘Litmus Test': Will there be consequences for Tehran's stonewalling of U.N. nuclear inspectors?" The Washington Post, May 28, 2008; A12
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/27/AR2008052702752_pf.html
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