I should note two points to provide context for the discussion that follows. First, in referring to "conservatives" and "progressives," I have principally in mind members of these groups whose psychological dispositions have been given concrete shape in the context of American social, political, and religious life. And, second, although I distinguish fundamental differences between the mindsets of conservatives and progressives, I recognize that, since both groups share a common humanity, each also shares a part of the other's psychology. That means that my characterizations of both mindsets are representative, not depictions based on actual individuals. It also means that, for both groups, a narrow window always remains open for mutual influence and accommodation.
The Conservative Emphasis on "Interests" and Struggle
With the caveat that these qualifications be kept in mind, I would suggest that the sense of self held by prototypical conservatives derives fundamentally from connections with the outside world that prove decisive in shaping their aspirations, perceptions, and values. Such connections might include, for example, inherited temperament and aptitudes; parental behavior; family income and values; educational development; religious, university, and social affiliations; job, career, or professional expectations; social and economic status; and cultural and political values held in common with a group or locality. It is to be expected that persons with a self-identity shaped by such connections will perceive them as "interests" they must continually strive to uphold. Any failure to do so would loosen their grip on the sense of self and possibly cause behavioral disorientation.
Given their need to vindicate the influences that have shaped them, prototypical conservatives accept the world as a place of conflict and struggle. In it, they believe, individuals must fight to preserve their claims on particular associations, beliefs, behaviors, undertakings, and achievements against other individuals who have competing claims.
This mindset poses a formidable barrier to any influence by progressive political values. Prototypical conservatives have little sense of an underlying connectedness with others that transcends individual identities shaped by biology and the social order. For that reason, they feel little attraction to abstract concepts of human linkage such as humanity, and prefer instead to join or create interest or social groups at the local level within which they can both commit their loyalty and gain support.
In terms of national politics, most conservatives dismiss out of hand the notion of America as a nationwide community in which all of its members accept responsibility to help ensure a decent life for all the rest. Conservatives take this position for two characteristic reasons: first, because such an egalitarian social order could not be sustained without (what they consider) the "intrusion" of policies and programs designed and implemented by the federal government; and, second, because the policies and programs would have to be subsidized by remote tax payers who have no direct role in designing them, and who, in many cases, would derive no direct benefit from them. What conservatives do want from the federal government is something completely opposite: that it safeguard, and even expand, the freedom of individuals to pursue by any legal means necessary the economic success or social place to which they aspire, or to fully preserve the rewards of success they've already achieved. For conservatives who have attained a good life for themselves and their family, and therefore a stake in the system, the idea of a government-imposed redistribution of wealth is anathema.
Two Conservative Traits Are Deeply Ingrained in the National Character
The individualism ingrained in many Americans was already noted by Alexis de Toqueville during his travels in America before the middle of the 19th century. In the second volume of his classic Democracy in America, he writes: "Americans alternately display passions so strong and so similar first for their own welfare and then for liberty that one must suppose these urges to be united and mingled in some part of their being. Americans in fact do regard their freedom as the best tool of and the firmest guarantee for their prosperity. They love them both for the sake of each other. They are therefore by no means inclined to suppose that it is no business of theirs to meddle in public affairs. On the contrary, they think it their most important concern to secure a government which will allow them to get the good things they want and which will not stop their enjoying those they have in peace." [From p. 541 of the George Lawrence translation of Democracy in America, edited by J.P. Mayer: Anchor Books edition, Garden City, New York, 1969.]
Another aspect of the "American character" further suggests why many Americans resist any actions of government that would modify the conditions under which they privately operate--even those that, on the surface at least, seem constructive and grounded in sound policy. During a six-month book tour in America in 1842, Charles Dickens arrived at his own view on the subject, which he summarized in the final chapter of his American Notes for General Circulation. After first observing that the American people "are, by nature, frank, brave, cordial, hospitable, and affectionate," Dickens wrote:
"One great blemish in the popular mind of America, and the prolific parent of an innumerable brood of evils, is Universal Distrust. Directly you reward a benefactor, or a public servant, you distrust him, merely because he is rewarded. Any man who attains a high place among you, from the President downwards, may date his downfall from that moment; for any printed lie that any notorious villain pens, although it militate directly against the character and conduct of a life, appeals at once to your distrust, and is believed."
The reason Americans distrust success, Dickens seems to suggest, is that they understand how easily it can be achieved through the freedom America offers to live a life "on the make," unhindered by any overriding regard for the cost it may impose on others. At the same time, however, he observes that Americans are great admirers of the "sharp dealing" often involved in a life on the make, even when it involves "swindle and gross breach of trust." To prove the point, he offers this fictional dialog, based, he says, "on a hundred actual conversations":
"Is it not a very disgraceful circumstance that such a man as So-and-So should be acquiring a large property by the most infamous and odious means, and notwithstanding all the crimes of which he has been guilty, should be tolerated and abetted by your Citizens? He is a public nuisance, is he not?" 'Yes, sir.' "A convicted liar?" 'Yes, sir.' "He has been kicked, and cuffed, and caned?" 'Yes, sir.' "And he is utterly dishonourable, debased, and profligate?" 'Yes, sir.' "In the name of wonder, then, what is his merit?" 'Well, sir, he is a smart man.'"
The simple inference made by the ordinary American, as suggested by Dickens, is that any better-off American successful enough to offer you the chance to gain a benefit you don't have to earn is undoubtedly "on the make" to further fill his pockets at your expense. You may admire his shrewdness, and even wish to emulate it, but you can't trust him to have your own welfare in mind or at heart.
Fear of the Progressive Mindset
Today's conservatives run the same risk of "sharp dealings" in their own quest for "success" as did the Americans Dickens described, but they also hold their competitors' shrewdness, energy, and perseverance in the same high esteem. They do not fear other "self-made" men (or women), since these others think and behave just as they themselves do and are a necessary part of the world as they understand it.
Conservatives do, however, fear those of a "progressive" mindset, who in their view represent a challenge to their entire way of life. In the minds of conservatives generally, and especially those on the militant political Right, progressives constitute a self-anointed elite that, despite its small size, is intent on revolutionary change that would destroy their way of life. It would replace a familiar social order, based on the values of individualism, competition, and material success, with an alien and unworkable order in which the unproductive would be raised up and the innovators and job producers brought down.
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