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Of War and Peace in East Asia

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Jan VanDenBerg
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Both of these are probably half-fraudulent. KJU is assuming the public posture of a newly-secure-and-now-magnanimous owner of his very own nuclear umbrella, but the re-entry survival of his payloads is still not in the bag and his nuclear testing ground has apparently been rendered worthless (so he has offered it up as a concession). Meanwhile the extent to which the new sanctions are actually biting and are not being secretly subverted with the help of both the Russians and the Chinese, as well as humble smugglers, is unclear.

In any case, KJU probably sincerely needs relief on the economic front and quickly. His economy has never been strong and the new sanctions, even if only half-effective, are surely hurting.

So, Kim is going into the summit with Trump both weak and strong, on different fronts. He needs the sanctions lifted and he seems to be making good progress in creating an atmosphere wherein Trump will be damaged if that does not happen, so Trump is under increasing pressure to cave or to accept cosmetic or unverifiable "reductions" in NK nuclear deterrence.

At the same time, if Trump were clever, he could exploit the fact that mere delay or equivocation, the mere lack of progress, so the sanctions remain in place, could be quite painful to the DPRK. And, Trump gets some leverage from the fact that KJU's actual ability to physically bomb anything in the US is probably not that real.

It would be smart of the US to engage in delaying tactics, to let the bite of the new sanctions sink in -- it's not as though Los Angeles is in imminent danger of incoming missiles -- but Trump seems to be in the driver's seat and cleverly orchestrated, well-disciplined and planned tactics has not, to date, been Trump's strong suit.

The worst thing Trump could but might do would be to agree to reductions only in KJU's missile capabilities that threaten the US, while abandoning our allies -- Japan and SK -- to living under his guns. We could lose our allies to the Chinese, who are actually capable and willing to protect them, if we are not.

The most likely outcome of the summit is also probably the best -- nothing much really happens, the divas depart with facesaving but empty pronouncements, the sanctions continue to bite and Kim is forced to make real concessions to get relief in subsequent meetings between technocrats capable of detailed work.

However, the idea that he will give up his hard-won missiles and nuclear warheads, even if they might burn up overhead like shooting stars if ever actually used, is surely a fantasy. The US needs to focus on and create expectations for more reasonable goals in these talks, goals -- such as arranging for Chinese to seize control of the DPRK arsenal and foreign policy, while keeping the figleaf of a Korean-led regime in place -- that will eventually get us where we know we have to end up, which is free of Kim drama, the inevitable acceptance of NK as an unattackable nuclear state but a state on the road to the eventual erosion of the current vicious, inhumane and unacceptable Kim regime through NK's trade and interaction with the outside world (which we should allow and participate in),the insertion of spies and informers, and the development of black markets, smuggling and non-state supply to the needs of the population. That erosion should, even if it takes 50 years, result in internal reform and coups, as the economic logic of throwing off autarky and excessive state control is overwhelming.

China seems to think it can have the best of both worlds -- state control and wealth-creating business activity -- but, if it manages that, it will be the first such success in dozens and dozens of attempts by many nations. While improved technological capabilities may have made state-controlled economies more successful than in the past, there is no precedent for state-controlled financial/business success.

There is, however, a real risk, with a leading actor as unstable as Trump, that some kind of conflagration or backlash in response to insult or disappointment could occur. The best protection against that is the cool heads of leaders in the region with a lot more to lose than a US president -- Moon, Abe and even Xi. They will rush to smooth things over, even to conceal untoward interchanges, and to keep the summit itself a non-event. The meeting should be held in some locale where local entities can control the version of events that is released, so embarrassment or perceived slights on either side are papered over through the cooperation of lower-level cooler heads on all sides, and don't escalate. The DMZ would be good.

Let's get through this charade, so the real business of professional negotiations, with both the Chinese on trade and domestic business practices and the DPRK on exactly how interaction and trade with the outside world, which is likely to eventually bring down the Kim regime, even if it does have nuclear weapons, can proceed.

Active and fair trade is the basis of good, stable, interdependent -- and so peaceful -- international relations and human prosperity.

The promotion of the same should be the primary and ultimate goal of US policy in East Asia.


(Article changed on May 6, 2018 at 16:55)

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Jan VanDenBerg earned a Master's Degree from the Economics Department of Stanford University in 1987.  She served as head Japan economist for Merrill Lynch Tokyo 1987-1993, and worked for the US Treasury Department Office of (more...)
 

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