Other recent examples reveal how intractable this landscape has become. For example, one Princeton computer scientist, who recently waved an olive branch conceding that digital technology has legitimate uses in voting systems, more recently delighted in repeatedly announcing that BMDs could theoretically be hacked to alter the totals.
"Practically any computer is hackable," Princeton's Andrew Appel wrote on the Freedom to Tinker blog. Thus, having that digital layer between voters making their choices on a screen and the printing of a ballot summary card was an open invitation to hacking, he noted, saying that was "such a bad idea that it should be considered a design flaw."
The firm whose BMD he targeted, Dominion, replied that its system does not fabricate votes. Appel essentially countered, So what? A hacker's code would do that. Dominion replied that Appel's scenario was not a likely real-world threat. Jousting and talking past the other side is typical in this fold. This episode didn't stop here.
Another computer scientist, Richard DeMillo, from the Georgia Institute of Technology, concurred with Appel. Their agreement prompted Douglas Kellner, co-chair of New York State's Board of Elections, to call for an investigation as Dominion is seeking to certify its system in the state. Activist bloggers jumped on this bandwagon, incorrectly saying that bar code ballots could not be verified. One article was originally titled, "Permission to Cheat: Audits Can't Detect Fake Votes on New Hybrid Voting Machines."
Another missive echoing this same claim came last week as a Daily Kos petition. It said:
"IN HIS PRIOR ROLE AS GEORGIA'S SECRETARY OF STATE, [REPUBLICAN GOV.] BRIAN KEMP TRIED TO BLOCK 53,000 VOTER REGISTRATIONS THAT WERE OVERWHELMINGLY FROM PEOPLE OF COLOR AND SUCCESSFULLY PURGED NEARLY 10 PERCENT OF THE STATE'S VOTERS FROM THE ROLLS.
"NOW, KEMP WANTS THE STATE TO SPEND $150 MILLION ON BUYING NEW VOTING MACHINES FROM A COMPANY [ES&S] WHERE HIS DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF WAS A FORMER LOBBYIST.
"THE NEW MACHINES HAVE NO PAPER TRAIL VOTERS CAN VERIFY (DESPITE THIS BEING A MAJOR PROBLEM IN PAST GEORGIA ELECTIONS), AND COST AT LEAST THREE TIMES AS MUCH AS PAPER BALLOTS."
Whether Georgia, or any jurisdiction, should buy very expensive new voting machines, or whether or not senior officials are too cozy with contractors, are separate and serious questions. But the assertion that there was "no paper trail" is not correct. It may not be unimpeachable like an individual voter's ink marks on paper which can't be hacked. But the assertion that bar codes and ballot summary cards cannot be audited is also wrong.
Georgia was one of the first states to buy DREs after 2002's Help America Vote Act. In 2019, it is one of the last states still using these systems. It is true that Georgia is seeking to buy pricy BMDs from ES&S (the nation's largest vendor) and that purchase may be a scandalous taxpayer giveaway. But the assertion that BMD ballot summary cards and their reported election outcomes cannot be double-checked for accuracy is incorrect.
Maryland was another state that invested early and heavily in DREs but reversed course. Apparently unknown to BMD critics, it has been independently auditing and verifying its bar code ballots and their related tabulations in a granular process that seeks to account for every vote cast. Maryland uses the systems for voters with disabilities and as backup should paper ballots run out, which was the case in some suburban counties in 2018.
Maryland's exampleMaryland's approach has not gained wide attention. But it is doing what critics allege cannot be done and arguably is a model for verifying vote counts. It is independently double-checking the accuracy of all of its initial results before announcing the official winners in its elections. This involves auditing both ink-marked paper ballots and the computer-generated ballot summary cards.
"I understand that we are the only state to have done it," said Nikki Charlson, Maryland State Board of Elections deputy administrator. "It works very well for us. And provides lots of other information that helps us improve election administration."
To verify its first unofficial vote totals, Maryland has been working with Clear Ballot. The firm pioneered a system that analyzes ballot image files produced by the scanners to independently verify the individual votes cast and audit the reported totals. Initially, Clear Ballot's system focused on counting the ink-marked paper, but because Maryland also used BMD systems it wrote additional software to analyze whether those electronic totals matched the ballot summary card's bar codes and printed voter choices.
"We wrote software that would comprehend the bar codes and then tally them up," said Larry Moore, Clear Ballot's founder and former CEO. "For the " [bar codes] we couldn't read, we had to examine them [the individual ballots] by hand."
As Adida said, BMD systems could be improved. Moore said that there was a higher percentage of unreadable bar codes on BMD ballots than there was with sloppily ink-marked ballots that could not be read by scanners. When bar codes were unreadable, Moore said technicians would examine that ballot's digital image to see the printed choice as part of a tally independently examining the initially reported results. In other words, the firm was independently checking to see if all of the elements in vote counting the electronic totals and printed ballot records were consistent.
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