Attack Syria First, Get Facts Later

Ralph Trapp, a consultant on proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, said he was "reasonably confident" that the U.N. team could clarify what had happened.

"They can definitely answer the question [of] whether there was a chemical attack, and they can tell which chemical was used," he said, by collecting samples from blood, urine and hair of victims. There was even "some chance" of finding chemical residue from ammunition pieces or craters where they landed. Trapp said it would take "several days" to complete an analysis.

Steve Johnson, who runs a program in chemical, biological and radiological weapons forensics at Cranfield University in the United Kingdom, said that by the end of the week the U.N. might be able to answer whether "people died of a nerve agent." Johnson said the team, if pushed, could produce "some kind of view" on that issue within 24 to 48 hours.

Dan Kastesza, a 20-year veteran of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps and a former adviser to the White House on chemical and biological weapons proliferation, told IPS the team will not be looking for traces of the nerve gas sarin in blood samples but rather chemicals produced when sarin degrades.

But Kastesza said that once samples arrive at laboratories, specialists could make a determination "in a day or two" about whether a nerve agent or other chemical weapons had been used.

The real reason for the Obama administration's hostility toward the U.N. investigation appears to be the fear that the Syrian government's decision to allow the team access to the area indicates that it knows that U.N. investigators will not find evidence of a nerve gas attack.

The administration's effort to discredit the investigation recalls the George W. Bush administration's rejection of the position of U.N. inspectors in 2002 and 2003 after they found no evidence of any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the administration's refusal to give inspectors more time to fully rule out the existence of an active Iraqi WMD program.

In both cases, the administration had made up its mind to go to war and wanted no information that could contradict that policy to arise.