According to Gary Gorton [4], the repo market before the crisis was estimated to be worth a whopping $12 trillion as compared to the total assets in the entire US banking system of $10 trillion.
The former CEO of Federal Reserve Bank of New York (NYFRB) and now the US Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner observed in 2008:
"The structure of the financial system changed fundamentally during the boom, with dramatic growth in the share of assets outside the traditional banking system. This non-bank financial system grew to be very large, particularly in money and funding markets.
"This parallel system financed some of these very assets on a very short term basis in the bilateral or tri-party repo markets. As the volume of activity in repo markets grew, the variety of assets financed in this manner expanded beyond the most highly liquid securities to include less liquid securities, as well. Nonetheless, these assets were assumed to be readily sellable at fair values, in part because assets with similar credit ratings had generally been tradable during past periods of financial stress. And the liquidity supporting them was assumed to be continuous and essentially frictionless, because it had been so for a long time.
"The scale of long term risky and relatively illiquid assets financed by very short-term liabilities made many of the vehicles and institutions in this parallel financial system vulnerable to a classic type run, but without the protection such as deposit insurance that the banking system has in place to reduce such risks."
Economic historians will argue for another century as to the cause for the run on the repo market. The collapse of Bear Stearns is as good a starting point as any. When the market discovered that its securities were duds, pure junk, shock waves ripped through the system.
Recall that I had mentioned earlier that Federal Bank of New York and JP Morgan Chase were the primary clearing banks for repos.
The Fed's rescue of Bear Stearns through JP Morgan was not so much to save the former but rather to shore up the "clearing system" of the repos for which JP Morgan Chase and the Bank of New York were the main pillars. One of the functions of a "clearing bank" for repos is to value and match securities tendered for cash borrowings. If Bear Stearns securities are now valued as junks, the integrity of JP Morgan and Federal Bank of New York as clearing banks in this market is as good as zero! And bearing in mind that the five major investment banks in the US rely heavily on the repo market for their funding, any gridlock in this part of the shadow banking system would tear wide open the entire banking system, including the traditional counter-part.
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