The United Nation Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)'s has imported and now
introduced a sixty weeks reintegration plan for ex-Maoist Combatants in Nepal.
It has come in a crucial strategic period and political transition period of
Nepal. The UNMIN is being accused that it has been working against its mandate
and favoring particular political powers and ideologies. Often, UNMIN tries to
intervene in domestic political affairs, which crosses its limitation. In the
past, the chief of UNMIN was about to be declared Persona non grata. Today,
Nepal has just a caretaker government and is suffering from political limbo. As
many of us know, the ongoing political escapades in Nepal are not favorable for
an effective and successful implementation of a comprehensive peace process and
related plans.
The "Reintegration Plan" of the UNMIN has come as a nasty surprise
for domestic peace stakeholders, because the plan was supposed to come after
political consensus and proper homework - respecting the aspirations and needs
of the nation. It did not, however, come in the right time, right manner, right
way or by the right authority. It is nothing special, just a way to please
donors in the community; to allow the UN General Secretary to be safe; and to
sustain both his job and the life of UNMIN in Nepal. It is an open secret to
all that the ill-fated plan cannot work for reintegration.
Naturally, the plan has come under serious dispute and has been straightforwardly rejected by the head of the Government and its coalition parties, which should be regarded as a major fault of the plan. On the one hand, the Prime Minister Mr. Nepal has already threatened UNMIN against its so-called reintegration plan and on the other hand the Maoist has also expressed its strategic discrepancy by developing its own party's reintegration plan. On the other side, the ex Maoist combatants and other stakeholders including civil societies, private communities and general citizens are also not happy with the plan. Its simple--no one is happy except the employees and allies of UNMIN.
There are lots of problems with the plan. First, it sounds like its prepared in an academic manner, ignoring the sensitivity of local socioeconomic and political scenario. It seems the plan is designed and developed by those experts who are aware about the literature and story but not about the facts, local context and relevant contents of Nepal.
Secondly, it has no participatory planning characters that are
must for any reintegration plan. Third, it has neither sustainability measures
about the plan nor is it owned by government or the particular authority e.g.
state/executive or parliamentary committees, civil society, local government or
any authorities that are directly supported and authorized by the government.
It is because the government is the only authority who has ultimate and final
accountability to manage and deal with pre to post phases of reintegration and
to entire processes with its citizens. It is not just a matter of peace and
politics--it has to do with national and internal laws too. Furthermore, it is
also true that the UNMIN has not worked properly in profiling and opportunity
mapping areas that are a must for any successful reintegration plan. Thus, the
locals in Nepal consider the aired reintegration plan as an
authoritative/interventional course of action.
In my observation, UNMIN and respective outsiders should pay more attention and
need to be careful about its given mandate and legitimized role. They should
understand "reintegration" is not like distributing food packets or
organizing seminar projects. The reintegration is related to the past and the
long term future of the nation's people, as well as its peace, polity, and
governance related affairs.
It has broader areas and scope, which has a lot to do with political consensus and agreements. So, they must attempt to work on a pre-policy impact assessment approach and must use the conflict sensitivity analysis while working on such crucial plans, policies, programs and projects in such a conflict-affected fragile country like Nepal, which is a among the poorest countries of the world. It is on the one hand a post-conflict nation and on the other hand it has severe ongoing arm ethno-regional-political insurgencies in various parts of Nepal. The reintegration plan has direct relations and links with other ongoing insurgency groups and its insurgents' arm group, so it need be clarified before to introduce such policy and plan. Though, UNMIN has not yet presented any strategy to address the issue in their so called advertised disabled reintegration plan, which is unfortunate one. UNMIN must know that any reintegration plan should not undermine the contemporary sociopolitical situation or the sustainability of its long term management while introducing the reintegration plan.
Sadly, the UNMIN has failed to recognize even the existing and potential actors of reintegration. The UNMIN deliberately failed to consider the importance of, or to coordinate with the various stakeholders in different layers. Therefore, the UNMIN must correct its roles and activities regarding the reintegration of ex combatants in Nepal, otherwise, such plans could add more political tension and confusion over the peace process in an upcoming day in Nepal. The poorly designed reintegration plan may push the nation into further conflict and political polarization. It could stymie the entire ongoing peace process. Of course it would be vexing to bring the peace process into its logical end.
Any plan from the UNMIN that may assist the mismanagement of ex combatants and their future should not come into the nation. The UNMIN has no rights or authority to play with the future of the nation and its citizens. The time will come soon where the state will get stronger, and will be compelled to take action against the UNMIN--and declare their officials Persona non grata, if they continue such activities in the upcoming days.
