Gates declared that a new Production Evaluation Staff would aggressively review their analytical products and serve as his "junkyard dog."
Gates' message was that the DI, which had long operated as an "ivory tower" for academically oriented analysts committed to objectivity, would take on more of a corporate culture with a product designed to fit the needs of those up the ladder both inside and outside the CIA.
"It was a kind of chilling speech," recalled Peter Dickson, an analyst who concentrated on proliferation issues. "One of the things he wanted to do, he was going to shake up the DI. He was going to read every paper that came out. What that did was that everybody between the analyst and him had to get involved in the paper to a greater extent because their careers were going to be at stake."
A chief Casey-Gates tactic for exerting tighter control over the analysis was to express concern about "the editorial process," Dickson said.
"You can jerk people around in the editorial process and hide behind your editorial mandate to intimidate people," Dickson said.
Gates soon was packing the analytical division with his allies, a group of managers who became known as the "Gates clones." Some of those who rose with Gates were David Cohen, David Carey, George Kolt, Jim Lynch, Winston Wiley, John Gannon and John McLaughlin.
Pakistani Proliferation
Though Dickson's area of expertise -- nuclear proliferation -- was on the fringes of the Reagan administration's primary concerns, it ended up getting him into trouble anyway. In 1983, he clashed with his superiors over his conclusion that the Soviet Union was more committed to controlling proliferation of nuclear weapons than the administration wanted to hear.
When Dickson stood by his evidence, he soon found himself facing accusations about his fitness and other pressures that eventually caused him to leave the CIA.
Dickson also was among the analysts who raised alarms about Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons, another sore point because the Reagan administration wanted Pakistan's assistance in funneling weapons to Islamic fundamentalists fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.
One of the effects from the exaggerated intelligence about the Soviet menace was to make other potential risks -- such as allowing development of a nuclear bomb in the Islamic world or training Islamic fundamentalists in techniques of sabotage -- pale in comparison.
While worst-case scenarios were in order for the Soviet Union and its clients, best-case scenarios were the order of the day for Reagan's allies, including Osama bin Laden and other Arab extremists rushing to Afghanistan to wage a holy war against European invaders, in this case, the Russians.
As for the Pakistani drive to get a nuclear bomb, the Reagan administration turned to word games to avoid triggering anti-proliferation penalties that otherwise would be imposed on Pakistan.
"There was a distinction made to say that the possession of the device is not the same as developing it," Dickson told me. "They got into the argument that they don't quite possess it yet because they haven't turned the last screw into the warhead."
Finally, the intelligence on the Pakistan Bomb grew too strong to continue denying the reality. But the delay in confronting Pakistan ultimately allowed the Muslim government in Islamabad to produce nuclear weapons. Pakistani scientists also shared their know-how with "rogue" states, such as North Korea and Libya.
"The politicization that took place during the Casey-Gates era is directly responsible for the CIA's loss of its ethical compass and the erosion of its credibility," Goodman told the Senate Intelligence Committee in 1991.
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